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When a worker sues an employer, the employer sometimes learns
thereafter that the worker had committed some misconduct at the time of
hire or while on the job. In those cases, most American work laws provide
the employer with a defense that precludes employer liability, or at least
limits remedies, if the employer shows that, had it known of the worker’s
misconduct at the time of its allegedly wrongful act, it would have fired the
worker because of that misconduct. This Article evaluates the prevailing
arguments for and against the employee-misconduct defense as it appears
in the National Labor Relations Act, federal and state employment
discrimination and retaliation statutes, state contract and tort law, as well as
state workers’ compensation statutes. It finds that virtually all of these
arguments (both for and against) are incomplete, incoherent, or rely on
unverified empirical premises. This finding implies that, though pervasive,
virtually no sound reason currently exists for adopting the defense or (apart
from stare decisis) continuing to apply it.
INTRODUCTION
A worker sues an employer for an illegal firing or refusal to hire. The
employer discovers after its alleged illegal act that, when hired or while on
the job, the worker had committed some kind of misconduct. He had lied
on his résumé about his prior education or criminal record. She had stolen
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. For comments on
prior drafts, the author thanks Peter Siegelman, Jon Bauer, Richard Michael Fischl, and
participants at the 2011 Seton Hall Employment and Labor Law Scholars’ Forum.
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office supplies or company trade secrets. He had smoked marijuana or
taken some other illicit drug. Cases like these raise this question: what if
the employer had discovered this worker misconduct before the employer’s
allegedly illegal act, such as an illegal firing? If so, would that employer
have fired the worker solely because of that worker’s misconduct, and
could it have done so lawfully?
Under many American work laws, employers who prove this
counterfactual enjoy an affirmative defense. This defense defeats employer
liability in the worker’s suit, or at least precludes certain remedies:
reinstatement and front pay, as well as any back pay otherwise owed for the
time after the employer in fact discovered the employee’s misconduct.
This defense pervades American work law. It appears in the National
Labor Relations Act, most federal and state employment discrimination
statutes, some state contract and tort law, and many state workers’
compensation statutes. Legal commentary has largely focused on such a
defense in federal employment discrimination law.1
This Article examines the set of prevailing arguments for and against
the current forms of this employee-misconduct defense. It finds that these
arguments, both for and against, are remarkably incomplete, incoherent, or
rely on unverified empirical premises. This finding is startling and perhaps
counterintuitive. Usually, difficult value tradeoffs underlie debates about
work law rules. In contrast, the employee-misconduct defense lacks what
every legal rule needs for legitimacy: a coherent justification.
This Article thus challenges the legitimacy of every (actual or
potential) work law claim outcome (including settlement) that the defense
has or will adversely affect. It shows that virtually no sound reason
currently exists for adopting the defense, because the defense, in its current
forms, contravenes the restorative (make-whole) purposes of the work laws
into which it has been read. And where it has already been adopted, this
Article implies that there is virtually no sound reason for continuing to
1. E.g., Robert Brookins, Policy Is the Lodestar When Two Wrongs Collide: After-
Acquired Evidence Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 72 N.D. L. REV. 197
(1996); William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, The Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at
Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 369–71 (1996); Melissa
Hart, Retaliatory Litigation Tactics: The Chilling Effects of “After-Acquired Evidence”, 40
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 401 (2008); Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an
Employer’s Cognitive Dissonance, 60 MO. L. REV. 89 (1995); Jenny B. Wahl, Protecting the
Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Perverse Consequences of the McKennon Rule, 32 AKRON L.
REV. 577 (1999); Rebecca Hanner White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper Role of After-
Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 35 B.C. L. REV. 49 (1993).
For a broader but outdated survey, see Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge
Misconduct Discovered After an Employees’ Termination as a Defense in Employment
Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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apply the employee-misconduct defense, except for the thin reed of stare
decisis.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I shows how the defense has
been adopted into American work law. The rest of the Article evaluates
prevailing justifications for and against the defense. Part II shows how the
defense poorly compensates, and sometimes overcompensates, the
employer for losses suffered because of employee misconduct. Part III
shows that little evidence supports the premises of deterrence rationales for
the defense.
Part IV focuses on the defense variant that only precludes particular
remedies: reinstatement, front pay, and full back pay. There, the Article
presents an alternative yet abandoned version of the defense that also
precludes those remedies, but only if the employer shows that, absent its
wrongful act, it still would have discovered the employee’s misconduct
when it did and would have fired him or her solely because of that
misconduct. The current defense does not require a would-have-discovered
showing. Thus, the current defense contravenes the restorative (make-
whole) purposes of the laws under which it arises.
Part V shows how some justifications for the defense largely turn on
errors about how a court’s legal authority to order reinstatement, front pay,
and back pay interacts with an employer’s legal authority to fire an
employee for misconduct.
Part VI discusses rationales for an employee-misconduct defense to
liability based on certain contract law principles—material breach and
fraudulent inducement—as well as the doctrine of unclean hands. These
rationales are incomplete, because they do not justify those features of the
defense that depart from what each state’s material-breach, fraudulent-
inducement, or unclean-hands doctrines generally require.
Part VII considers two justifications for the defense as it appears in
state workers’ compensation statutes: fighting fraud and the equal
opportunity goals of state second-injury funds.
Part VIII examines the main objection to an employee-misconduct
defense, that is, that it uniquely reduces attorney selection of, or the
settlement price for, otherwise meritorious cases. The Conclusion
summarizes and points to the limits of this Article.
I. THE DEFENSE ACROSS AMERICAN WORK LAW
This Part describes the employee-misconduct defense as it appears in
the National Labor Relations Act, federal and state employment
discrimination statutes, state contract and tort law, and state workers’
compensation statutes.
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A. National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has adopted the
employee-misconduct defense when deciding appropriate relief for unfair
labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section
10(c) of the NLRA, as codified, authorizes the Board “to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter,” except for
orders of reinstatement or back pay to employees “suspended or discharged
for cause.”2
Since at least John Cuneo, Inc. (1990),3 the NLRB has endorsed an
employee-misconduct defense that limits back pay and precludes
reinstatement.4 In John Cuneo, the employee, fired in violation of the
NLRA, made false statements on his employment application. The
administrative law judge found that, had it known of this misconduct, the
employer would never have hired him. The NLRB concluded that this
finding justified ending the back pay period on “the date [the employer]
acquired knowledge of [the employee’s] misconduct.”5 This approach, the
Board wrote, balanced the Board’s duty to remedy the NLRA violation
“against the public interest in not condoning [the employee’s] falsification
of his employment application.”6 In contrast, granting reinstatement and
full back pay would be “an undue windfall” to the employee, while
rejecting any back pay liability “would provide an undue windfall for the
[employer].”7
B. Employment Discrimination and Retaliation Statutes
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co. (1995),8 most courts have read employment discrimination
statutes, as well as some retaliation statutes, to limit the remedies available
2. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
3. 298 N.L.R.B. 856 (1990). For antecedents, see Rubinstein, supra note 1, at 6–12.
4. First Transit, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 825, 829 (2007); Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc.,
344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1277 (2005); In re Aldworth Co., Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 137, 147 (2002);
Marshall Durbin Poultry Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 68, 70 (1993), aff’d in relevant part, 39 F.3d
1312 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Mohave Elec. Coop., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 206 F.3d 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); N.L.R.B. v. Smucker Co., 130 F. App’x 596, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). But see
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (stating that any NLRA
back pay award to undocumented workers contravenes goals of Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986).
5. John Cuneo, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. at 856.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
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to the plaintiff-employee if the employer-defendant can show that, had the
employer known of the employee’s misconduct at the time of the
employer’s adverse act, it would have fired the employee because of that
misconduct.
McKennon concerned a worker’s suit against her former employer for
firing her because of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).9 Section 7(b) of the ADEA, as codified,
authorizes courts to “grant such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.”10 During a
deposition in this suit, the plaintiff testified that she had taken and copied
confidential company documents. On appeal, the Court presumed that the
employer had fired the plaintiff only because of her age, and that her
misconduct—copying the confidential documents—was “so grave that
[her] immediate discharge would have followed its disclosure in any
event.”11
The Court then asserted that whereas such a would-have-fired
showing was not a defense to ADEA liability, section 7(b) of the ADEA
did require taking “due account of the lawful prerogatives of the employer
in the usual course of its business and the corresponding equities that it has
arising from the employee’s wrongdoing.”12 Accordingly, the employer
could use evidence of employee misconduct as a defense to certain
remedies: “Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence
of wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such
severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those
grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the
discharge.”13 Given this requisite showing “here, and as a general rule in
cases of this type, neither reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate
remedy.”14 Moreover, the Court barred back pay otherwise due after the
date the employer discovered the information about the employee
misconduct. The trial judge could then further adjust the back pay award
by “taking into further account extraordinary equitable circumstances that
affect the legitimate interests of either party.”15
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided McKennon, most courts have
followed McKennon’s approach for other federal anti-discrimination
statutes16 and some state employment discrimination statutes.17 Courts
9. Id. at 354–55.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006).
11. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 356.
12. Id. at 361.
13. Id. at 362–63.
14. Id. at 361–62.
15. Id. at 362.
16. E.g., Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1021 (11th Cir. 2001) (Title
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have also followed the McKennon approach for claims against employers
under statutes that prohibit employers from retaliating against workers for
filing or supporting the filing of claims under employment discrimination
statutes18 or workers’ compensation statutes.19 Like McKennon, the
underlying statutes in all of these cases have no express provision
authorizing this defense. Yet, courts recognize the defense nonetheless,
largely by assuming that McKennon applies, expressly relying on the
reasoning in McKennon, and sometimes emphasizing the similarities in
purpose or text between the statutes discussed in McKennon and the statute
at issue.
Although the McKennon Court expressly refused to rely on an unclean
hands defense to preclude ADEA liability,20 some California courts have
recognized unclean hands as a defense to statutory discrimination liability
in certain kinds of cases. In Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro
(1995),21 one of the plaintiffs brought a claim for wrongful discharge under
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, but had not revealed a
prior felony conviction on his job application. The employer’s contract
with a federal government agency required it to periodically certify that
none of its employees had a felony conviction. Departing from McKennon,
a California appellate court relied on the doctrine of unclean hands to
conclude that “the equities compel” no employer liability for the wrongful
VII); Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 837 (4th Cir. 2001) (Family and Medical Leave
Act); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir. 1995) (Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act); Hunter v. Ark Rests. Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1998) (42 U.S.C. §
1981); E.E.O.C. Enforcement Guidance, No. 915.002, 1995 WL 1789069, at *1 n.1 (Dec.
14, 1995) (“The principles applied by the McKennon Court are applicable to charges
brought under Title VII . . . and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . .”)
(citations omitted).
17. E.g., Brown Distrib. Co. v. Marcell, 890 So. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005); Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A., Inc. v. Epperson, 945 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Ky. 1996);
Smith v. Charter Twp. of Union, 575 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Wright v.
Rest. Concept Mgmt., 532 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Meads v. Best Oil Co.,
725 N.W.2d 538, 545–46 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Cicchetti v. Morris Cnty. Sheriff’s Office,
947 A.2d 626, 642–43 (N.J. 2008); McCarthy v. Pall Corp., 625 N.Y.S.2d 296, 296 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995); Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Durham Technical Cmty. Coll., 577 S.E.2d 670,
675–76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Norwood v. Litwin Eng’rs & Constructors, 962 S.W.2d 220,
223 (Tex. App. 1998); Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 971 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999);
Barlow v. Hester Indus., 479 S.E.2d 628, 643 (W. Va. 1996).
18. E.g., Walters v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 537 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1995); see also
Baber v. Greenville Cnty., 488 S.E.2d 314, 320–21 (S.C. 1997) (state whistleblower act);
Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 672 A.2d 697, 703–04 (N.H. 1996) (same).
19. Trico Techs. Corp. v. Montiel, 949 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. 1997); Beaulieu of Am.,
Inc. v. Kilgore, 680 So. 2d 288, 295 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); see also Mosley v. Truckstops
Corp. of Am., 891 P.2d 577, 582–84 (Okla. 1994).
20. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360.
21. 35 Cal. App. 4th 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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termination “where an employee who is disqualified from employment by
government-imposed requirements nevertheless obtains a job by
misrepresenting the pertinent qualifications.”22
C. State Contract and Tort Law
Some state courts have justified an employee-misconduct defense to
contract liability by relying upon two principles under state contract law:
the material failure of a contract party to perform a contractual duty23 and,
for cases where the worker makes false statements on a résumé or job
application, the fraudulent-inducement defense.24 A few other state courts
have also adopted an employee-misconduct defense to contract liability for
wrongful discharge, albeit on more opaque grounds.25 Moreover, in states
recognizing a common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, a few courts have recognized the employee-misconduct
defense, most following McKennon and precluding reinstatement, front
pay, and full back pay.26
D. Workers’ Compensation Law
In workers’ compensation law, legislatures and courts have adopted
employer defenses based on false statements by an employee at the time of
hire that concerned a prior medical condition.
First, some state workers’ compensation statutes preclude benefits for
injury if, at the time of “entering into employment,” the employee had
misrepresented that he had been disabled, laid off, or compensated because
22. Id. at 638; see also Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 833, 845
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing discrimination claim in Camp).
23. O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795–96 (Ariz. 1998);
accord Loftis v. Key Energy Servs., Inc., No. 07-2871, 2008 WL 2609918, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 26, 2008) (Pennsylvania law); Dobinsky v. Crompton & Knowles Colors Inc., No.
3:02CV1291, 2004 WL 2303686, at *4–7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2004) (same); Teter v.
Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 340 (Tenn. 2005); see also McDill v.
Environamics Corp., 757 A.2d 162, 166 (N.H. 2000) (quoting O’Day).
24. Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 547–48 (Colo. 1997); see
McDill, 757 A.2d at 166 (following Crawford); see also Crawford, 938 P.2d at 548
(referring to unclean hands doctrine to reject promissory estoppel claim).
25. Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 444–45 (S.C. 1998); Gassmann v.
Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc., Inc., 933 P.2d 743, 746–47 (Kan. 1997);
Schuessler v. Benchmark Mktg. & Consulting, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 529, 541 (Neb. 1993).
26. O’Day, 959 P.2d at 798; Silver v. CPC-Sherwood Manor, Inc., 151 P.3d 127, 131
(Okla. 2006); Riddle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 998 P.2d 114, 120 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (tort
of retaliatory discharge); Teter, 181 S.W.3d at 340 n.2; McDill, 757 A.2d at 166. But cf.
Camp, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 638 (barring employer liability under unclean hands doctrine for
tort claims of wrongful discharge under California law).
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of an “occupational disease” (such as silicosis or asbestosis) that caused the
condition for which the worker now seeks benefits.27 Workers’
compensation coverage for occupational diseases stems largely from
legislative lobbying starting in the 1930s to remove from civil courts tort
suits against employers for silicosis exposure.28
Second, some states have adopted by statute29 or court decision30 a
general defense to workers’ compensation liability for false statements on a
job application. This false-statement defense resembles the following
formulation in contemporaneous editions of the Larson workers’
compensation treatise:
The following factors must be present before a false statement at
the time of hiring will bar benefits: (1) The employee must have
knowingly and wilfully made a false representation as to his or
her physical condition. (2) The employer must have relied upon
the false representation and this reliance must have been a
substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been a
causal connection between the false representation and the
27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901.04(B) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-601(b)
(West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(20)(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151(b)
(West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-291 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-441 (2012); IOWA
CODE § 85A.7(1) (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316(7) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 39-A, § 604 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 9-502(e) (West 2012); see
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.431 (West 2012) (“previously suffered from”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 617.460(3) (LexisNexis 2012) (“Nothing in this chapter entitles an employee .
. . to compensation . . . for disability or death because of silicosis or a disease related to
asbestos in the event of the failure or omission on the part of the employee truthfully to
state, when seeking employment, the place, duration and nature of previous employment in
answer to an inquiry made by the employer.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (2012) (“disabled
or laid off because of asbestosis or silicosis”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-7 (2012) (“previously
had”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-80 (2011) (“previously suffered from”); cf. ALA. CODE § 25-
5-115 (2012) (“wilfully and falsely represented himself in writing to such employer as not
having previously been compensated in damages, or under this article, because of
occupational disease”).
28. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 78–86 (1991).
29. ALA. CODE § 25-5-51 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.022 (2012); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 342.165(2) (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1208.1 (2012); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 27A (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28.3 (West 2012); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 62-4-46 (2012).
30. Shippers Transp. of Ga. v. Stepp, 578 S.W.2d 232, 233–34 (Ark. 1979); Air Mod
Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434, 439 (Del. 1965); Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So. 2d 400,
406 (Fla. 1961); Ga. Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 378 S.E.2d 111, 114 (Ga. 1989); Clarion Mfg.
Corp. of Am. v. Justice, 971 S.W.2d 288, 290–91 (Ky. 1998); Jewison v. Frerichs Constr.,
434 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1989); Cooper v. McDevitt & St. Co., 196 S.E.2d 833, 835
(S.C. 1973); Fed. Copper & Aluminum Co. v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tenn. 1973);
Falls Church Const. Co. v. Laidler, 493 S.E.2d 521, 523 (Va. 1997).
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injury.31
Other courts have refused to recognize this defense by judicial
decision, emphasizing the lack of express statutory authority.32 A few of
these courts have also commented that such a rule runs contrary to the
general aim of workers’ compensation statutes: to remove employee fault
as a determinant of recovery for workplace injuries.33
Such false-statement defenses are not categorically preempted by Title
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA provides:
“Nothing in this [Act] alters the standards for determining eligibility for
benefits under State worker’s compensation laws . . . .”34 A court or agency
could plausibly treat a false-statement defense under state workers’
compensation law as a “standard for determining” benefit eligibility under
this provision, though none has yet done so. Moreover, the ADA and a
state-law false-statement defense do not necessarily conflict. If the
employer makes an ADA-prohibited employer inquiry into applicant
disability,35 a job applicant need not respond with a false statement.36
31. 3 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 66.04 (2011)
(footnotes omitted).
32. See Still v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 368 U.S. 35 (1961) (Federal Employers Liability
Act); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Hall, 674 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1982)
(Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act); Marriott Corp. v. Indus.
Comm’n of Ariz., 708 P.2d 1307, 1310–13 (Ariz. 1985); Teixeira v. Kauikeolani Children’s
Hosp., 652 P.2d 635, 636 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982); Fontenot v. Cagle Chevrolet, Inc., 417 So.
2d 1338, 1343–44 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Dressler v. Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp., 262
N.W.2d 629, 634 (Mich. 1978); Estate of Freeman v. J.L. Rothrock, Inc., 676 S.E.2d 46
(N.C. 2009); Goldstine v. Jensen Pre-Cast, 729 P.2d 1355, 1356–57 (Nev. 1986); Harris v.
Syracuse Univ., 168 A.D.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); H.J. Jeffries Truck Line v.
Grisham, 397 P.2d 637, 643 (Okla. 1964); Stovall v. Sally Salmon Seafood, 757 P.2d 410,
417–18 (Or. 1988); Blue Bell Printing v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 539 A.2d 933,
935–36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
33. See Marriott Corp., 708 P.2d at 1312; Stovall, 757 P.2d at 418; Fontenot, 417 So.
2d at 1343.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(e) (Supp. II 2009); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(3) (2011)
(same for ADA Title I regulations).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), (3) (2006); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.13(a), 1630.14(a)-(b)
(2011); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (2011) (interpretative guidance to Title I of ADA for 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)).
36. Caldwell v. Aarlin/Holcombe Armature Co., 481 S.E.2d 196, 198 (Ga. 1997). In
some states, the defense may not cover misrepresentations made in response to ADA-
prohibited employer inquiries. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.022 (2012) (only
misrepresentations made “after a conditional offer of employment”); cf. Huisenga v. Opus
Corp., 494 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 1992) (noting that given provisions in the Minnesota
Human Rights Act, defense does not apply if worker responded to employer questions
“regarding disabilities” unless employer shows that such “inquiries were job-related or
necessary to protect the safety of third-parties indispensable to the employer’s business”)
(footnote omitted).
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II. COMPENSATION RATIONALES
This Part identifies the problems with compensation rationales for the
employee-misconduct defense. For any such compensation rationale, the
defense must offset the employer’s liability in the worker’s suit to an extent
proportionate to the losses suffered by the employer because of that
worker’s misconduct. Thus, such compensation rationales face three
problems. First, in most cases, the defense poorly approximates the
monetary value of misconduct losses.37 Second, in some cases, the defense
enables overcompensation. In those cases, employers who prevail on the
defense are not thereby precluded from also recovering, in a counterclaim
or separate lawsuit against the worker, for losses caused by the same
employee misconduct that supports the defense. Third, the defense cannot
be justified as compensation for a kind of hard-to-measure misconduct-
loss: foregone worker productivity.
A. Poor Measure of Misconduct-Losses
In many cases, the value of an employee-misconduct defense (d) will
poorly approximate misconduct-related losses, because the value of what
the worker would have received but for the defense has nothing to do with
how much harm the worker’s misconduct caused (m).
To illustrate, suppose that a worker, paid $50/day, steals a box of
widgets worth $1000 from the employer’s supply room (m = $1000); the
worker is unlawfully discharged for some other reason; and thereafter the
employer finds proof of the worker’s theft. If the defense precludes
employer liability for the discharge, then for the defense to cover the
employer’s cost of replacing the widgets (d = m = $1000), the monetary
value of the remedies the worker would have otherwise received from the
employer must equal $1000. A dollar more, and the defense
overcompensates (d > $1000). A dollar less, and the defense
undercompensates (d < $1000). This poor approximation occurs, because
the value of the remedies that the worker would have received but for the
defense has nothing to do with how much harm the worker’s theft caused
the employer.
Similarly, suppose the defense does not defeat liability, but only
precludes back pay after the date the employer discovered the worker’s
37. For similar arguments against an employee-misconduct defense to ADEA liability,
see Brief of Petitioner at 29, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995)
(No. 93-1543), 1994 WL 385636 at *29; Reply Brief of Petitioner at 13–16, McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995) (No. 93-1543), 1994 WL 563409 at *13–
16.
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theft. For the defense to cover the employer’s cost of replacing the widgets
(d = m = $1000), exactly twenty days (assuming $50/day wages and a
seven-day work week) must have elapsed from when the employer
discovered the misconduct to the date of final judgment in the employee’s
suit. A day more, and the defense overcompensates (d > $1000). A day
less, and the defense does not compensate enough (d < $1000). This poor
approximation occurs, because the defense’s back pay restriction turns on
when the employer discovered the theft, which does not necessarily
determine how much harm the theft caused.
B. Overcompensation
The employee-misconduct defense can overcompensate the employer
in cases where the value of the defense (d) exceeds the net expected value
of the legal remedies available to employers under existing law for losses
caused by that same employee misconduct.
Under existing law, employers already have many grounds for
recovering losses caused by employee misconduct and can pursue that
recovery not only by a separate lawsuit, but also often by counterclaim in
the worker’s suit. For a worker who lies, the employer has the torts of
fraud or deceit. When a worker steals or damages employer’s property, the
employer has the tort law of conversion and trespass of chattels, as well as
state civil theft statutes38; for misappropriation of trade secrets, state law
variants of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act;39 and for claims of misuse of, or
damage to, computer systems, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.40 When
workers engage in conduct like luring away customers or co-workers for a
separate business venture while employed, some states’ agency laws
authorize claims of breach of an employee’s duty of loyalty.41
Most importantly, employers can anticipate damages recovery for
employee-misconduct losses when they write employment contracts. Such
contracts include not only express terms prohibiting specific kinds of
misconduct, but also, for example, a morals clause.42 Even absent any such
38. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-564 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.11
(West 2011); TEX. CIVIL PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 134.001–134.005 (Vernon 2011).
39. BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Robert A.
Blackstone et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2006).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (Supp. II 2009).
41. BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY (Stacey A. Campbell et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2010); Charles A. Sullivan,
Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law, and
Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777.
42. Marka B. Fleming et al., Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and
Postsecondary Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 B.Y.U.
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express terms, in some states, there is an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts, which imposes on both parties
the duty to act consistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations.43 Under
any of these contract terms, an employer can pursue a contract damages
action based on a worker’s misconduct, including misconduct discovered
after that worker’s quit or firing.
Because of these legal remedies that employers already have to
recover for worker misconduct,44 in some circumstances, the value of the
defense (d) will be such as to overcompensate the employer. To see this,
let pm − c equal the net expected value of the employer’s counterclaim or
separate lawsuit against an employee for his misconduct. Here, p is the
probability of winning the counterclaim or separate action,45 m is the
average value of legal remedies collectible for those losses, and c is the
additional cost of pursuing the counterclaim or separate lawsuit beyond the
costs to defend against the plaintiff’s claim. If the employer prevails on the
defense and the value of that defense exceeds the cost of pursuing the
counterclaim or separate lawsuit (d > c), then the defense overcompensates
the employer for losses suffered because of the employee’s misconduct,
because the employer who pursues the counterclaim or separate lawsuit can
recover d + (pm − c) for that same employee misconduct.46
This overcompensation result is possible, because the defense does not
preclude it and because the defense is not subject to the usual common law
rule barring multiple recoveries for the same injury.47 The defense falls
EDUC. & L.J. 67 (2009); Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares
About Morals? An Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent
Needs to Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 347 (2009).
43. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Ak. Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1223–24 (Alaska
1992); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985); Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 696 (1988); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479
A.2d 781, 789 (Conn. 1984); Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 101 (Del.
1992); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 389–90 (Idaho 2005); Metcalf v.
Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare
Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 856–57 (N.M. 1994).
44. For unionized firms, the employer must determine whether these and other state
law claims are sufficiently independent of the collective bargaining agreement to avoid
preemption under NLRA section 301.
45. Success on the defense does not affect p, except to the extent that the findings of
fact for the defense have a preclusive effect on the employer’s separate lawsuit by operation
of collateral estoppel doctrine.
46. If d ≤ c, then the defense arguably does not overcompensate, but only subsidizes
the employer for the expected cost of bringing the counterclaim or separate lawsuit. There
is, however, little basis for a litigation-cost subsidy rationale for the defense, because there
is little reason to assume that, in most cases, d ≤ c. Even if so, there may be far better ways
to provide such a subsidy, such as allowing the employer to claim c as a tax credit.
47. E.g., Medina v. Dist. of Columbia, 643 F.3d 323, 326–27 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
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outside this rule, because the defense defeats liability or restricts remedies
in the worker’s suit. It does not amount (formally) to a recovery of
employer’s losses caused by the worker’s misconduct, in part because the
value of d depends on the types of relief the worker seeks in his suit. If, for
example, the defense only precluded reinstatement and full back pay, but
the worker had sought only a declaratory judgment, then d would be zero.
In at least three circumstances, this overcompensation problem does
not exist. First, in cases where pm ≤ c, the rational employer expects no net
gain from filing a counterclaim or separate suit, and thus will not file.
Therefore, even if success on the merits was certain (p = 1), a rational
employer will not sue if the worker is judgment-proof. The worker,
however, will not be judgment-proof at least to the extent of worker assets
acquired from the worker’s own suit against the employer. (If that
recovery is zero because the worker cannot prove employer liability, then
the defense is unnecessary.)
Second, if the employer has liability insurance, the insurer, not the
employer, pockets the value of the defense. The defense, if successful, just
reduces what the insurer must pay to indemnify the policyholder (here, the
employer) for any money judgment against it arising from a claim that the
policy covers (in addition to litigation defense costs). In contrast, if the
employer pleads a counterclaim to recover misconduct-related losses, the
insurer has no right to the proceeds of that counterclaim as an offset to its
indemnification payment. Moreover, in the standard liability insurance
policy for employment-law liability, no provision expressly obligates the
insurer to cover, as part of litigation defense costs, the costs of pursuing an
employer counterclaim against the worker.48 Many courts have read other
kinds of liability insurance policies not to cover legal expenses associated
with pursuing counterclaims as part of the insurer’s duty to defend under
the policy,49 albeit with some exceptions.50
Tavaglione v. Billings, 847 P.2d 574, 614 (Cal. 1993); Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 952
A.2d 1, 29–30 (Conn. 2008); Saichek v. Lupa, 787 N.E.2d 827, 835 (Ill. 2003); Gagnard v.
Baldridge, 612 So. 2d 732, 736 (La. 1993); Elyousef v. O’Reilly & Ferrario, LLC, 245 P.3d
547, 549 (Nev. 2010); Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp., 691 S.E.2d 135, 153 (S.C.
2010); Nizan v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn. Nat. Ass’n, 650 S.E.2d 497, 502 (Va. 2007).
48. E.g., Insurance Services Office, Employment-Related Practices Liability Coverage
Form (EP 00 01 11 09).
49. E.g., Spada v. Unigard Ins. Co., 80 F. App’x 27, 29 (9th Cir. 2003) (Oregon law);
Parameter Driven Software, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 856 F. Supp. 314, 320 (E.D. Mich.
1993), aff’d, 25 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 1994) (Michigan law); James 3 Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch.,
111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 188–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Int’l Ins. Co. v. Rollprint Packaging
Products, Inc., 728 N.E.2d 680, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Duke Univ. v. St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 384 S.E.2d 36, 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Red Head Brass, Inc. v.
Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 735 N.E.2d 48, 56–57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Towne Realty, Inc. v.
PANDYA FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012 11:54 AM
880 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4
Third, if the employee misconduct supports an employer’s legal claim
that counts as a compulsory counterclaim,51 and if the employer fails to
plead that claim as a counterclaim in the worker’s suit, the employer
forfeits the value of that claim (pm − c). Applying a compulsory
counterclaim rule, some courts have barred claims by employers and
employees for failure to plead them as counterclaims in a prior suit with the
same parties. In some of those cases, the claim is compulsory because both
employer and worker assert contract claims based on the same employment
contract.52 In other employment cases, the claim and counterclaim have
different sources of law, but the underlying issues of fact are similar
enough to declare a “logical relationship” between them sufficient to
trigger a compulsory counterclaim rule.53 Accordingly, if a compulsory
counterclaim rule applies, this overcompensation problem does not exist.
C. Compensation for Foregone Worker Productivity
The employee-misconduct defense substitutes poorly for lost worker
productivity due to misconduct.54 Suppose that, in some cases, the
Zurich Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 64, 68–69 (Wis. 1996); Shoshone First Bank v. Pacific Emp’rs
Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510, 516–17 (Wyo. 2000).
50. Some courts have read a liability insurance policy to cover the cost of pursuing a
defendant’s counterclaim if such counterclaim is pursued to preclude or limit the
defendant’s liability under the plaintiff’s claim, e.g., Int’l Ins. Co., 728 N.E.2d at 694 (citing
counterclaim “for contribution” as example); see Smart Style Indus., Inc. v. Pa. Gen. Ins.
Co., 930 F. Supp. 159, 164–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“preemptive” declaratory judgment
action), or if pursuing it is “inextricably intertwined” with the defense against the plaintiff’s
claim, see, e.g., Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 752 F.Supp.2d 499, 514–16 (E.D. Pa.
2010); Ultra Coachbuilders, Inc. v. Gen. Sec. Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp.2d 284, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Bennett v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., ME CIV. No. 04-CV-212-GN, 2006 WL
1313059, at *4 (D. Me. May 12, 2006).
51. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A). Over forty states have a compulsory-
counterclaim rule that is similar in scope, but varies as to the types of claims expressly
exempted. E.g., TENN. CODE R. CIV. P. 13.01 (2012) (“other than a tort claim”); see Todd
David Peterson, The Misguided Law of Compulsory Counterclaims in Default Cases, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 1107, 1118-19 n. 57-59 (2008) (collecting citations).
52. E.g., Visual Factor, Inc. v. Sinclair, 441 P.2d 643, 645 (Colo. 1968); Brinkmann v.
Common School Dist. No. 27 of Gasconade Cnty., 238 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951);
CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., 6 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410 (3d ed. &
Supp. 2011).
53. E.g., Soni v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 74, 93 (D. Mass. 2009);
Klein v. London Star Ltd., 26 F. Supp. 2d 689, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Automated Datatron,
Inc. v. Woodcock, 659 F.2d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Align Tech., Inc. v. Bao Tran, 102
Cal. Rptr. 3d 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Medlin v. Carpenter, 329 S.E.2d 159, 164 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1985); Commint Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Quickel, 314 S.W.3d 646, 653 (Tex. App. 2010).
For courts adopting the logical-relationship test, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52, § 1410
n. 10.
54. For examples of damages for hard-to-measure losses in the Fair Labor Standards
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worker’s misconduct reliably predicts that worker’s below-average
productivity after the misconduct occurred. Suppose further that had the
employer known of the worker’s misconduct when it occurred, the
employer would have fired him for that reason and replaced him with
someone of at least average productivity. If so, the argument goes, by
concealing his misconduct, the worker caused the employer to suffer a loss:
Had the worker immediately revealed his misconduct and been fired for
that reason, the employer would have suffered no subsequent loss of
productivity from that time until the worker exited the employment
relationship. However, because this loss is hard to measure, the employer
cannot recover for it in a separate suit or counterclaim against the worker.
Thus, the value of the defense (d) arguably stands in for the otherwise hard-
to-measure loss from foregone worker productivity caused by the worker’s
misconduct.
This argument faces two hurdles. First, in industries where piece rates
prevail, wages are a function of the individual worker’s output, and thus
any particular worker’s productivity can be directly measured. Thus, we
can directly see if the worker who, for example, lied on his job application
actually had below-average productivity relative to other workers
performing the same tasks. In those cases, then, the defense is
unnecessary. Second, if the worker’s pay depends on time worked (e.g.,
hourly, weekly), and thus worker productivity is hard to measure, it
remains unclear why the defense, in any form, should be deemed to cover
the loss attributable to foregone worker productivity. Any sum said to
cover that loss is arbitrary, without knowing by how much that loss exceeds
zero.
III. DETERRENCE RATIONALES
This Part shows that any deterrence rationale for the defense turns on
how much the defense reduces worker misconduct, how well it does so,
and at what cost, compared to other policy options. Unlike the employer’s
right to fire for misconduct or right to sue to recover misconduct-related
losses, an employer cannot assert the defense unless the worker sues. Thus,
any deterrence rationale for the defense must presume: (1) that workers
who sue their employers are also more likely to commit employee
misconduct than workers who do not; or (2) that workers considering
misconduct actually worry about how such misconduct might affect their
legal rights if they were later subject to a wrongful act by their employer.
Act (FLSA), see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) and Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S.
697, 707–08 (1945).
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There is currently little evidence to support either premise in the limited
empirical literature on employee misconduct.55
Indeed, employee misconduct is itself hard to measure if it is not self-
reported or cheap to detect. For example, for résumé fraud, there is some
research based on survey self-reports of law students and law schools
concerning résumé discrepancies56 as well as researcher attempts to verify
the listed publications of medical residency and fellowship applicants.57 In
contrast, most press reports about résumé fraud tend to be based on
findings by background check firms of increases in discrepancies found in
the résumés or job applications that they have been asked to verify. Such
estimates suffer from selection bias, because employers do not randomly
choose résumés for background checks.
Yet, even assuming good measures of employee misconduct, a
deterrence rationale is hard to support. Consider, for example, one
sophisticated deterrence rationale. Following a textbook labor market
signaling model, Wahl (1999) argued that by limiting remedies instead of
precluding liability, McKennon reduced the reliability of self-reported
worker information (e.g., post-secondary education, criminal record) as
signals of worker productivity.58 This in turn, she worried, might make an
employer more likely to turn to race, sex, or other characteristics as signals
of productivity, contrary to the goals of employment discrimination laws.59
This argument rests on two premises. First, the cost of obtaining the
relevant signal includes the expected cost of sending a false signal, itself
some function of the odds and adverse consequences of detection. Second,
by not making defense a bar to liability, McKennon and its progeny
lowered the worker’s cost of sending false signals to prospective
employers.
This argument has two problems. First, even if it precludes liability,
an employee-misconduct defense may only negligibly affect the incidence
of résumé fraud, as compared to other potential influences. Such
influences include the average cost of pre-employment screening practices,
55. E.g., Steven H. Appelbaum et al., Employee Theft: From Behavioural Causation
and Prevention to Managerial Detection and Remedies, 9 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. 175 (2006);
Jill Poulston, Rationales for Employee Theft in Hospitality: Excuses, Excuses, 15 J.
HOSPITALITY & TOURISM MGMT. 49 (2008); Mark N. Wexler, Successful Resume Fraud:
Conjectures on the Origins of Amorality in the Workplace, 12 J. OF HUMAN VALUES 137
(2006).
56. E.g., Nancy Millich, Ethical Integrity in the Legal Profession: Survey Results
Regarding Law Students’ Veracity on Resumes and Recommendations for Enhancing Legal
Ethics Outside the Classroom, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1186–89 (1992).
57. Michael N. Wiggins, A Meta-Analysis of Studies of Publication Misrepresentation
by Applicants to Residency and Fellowship Programs, 85 ACAD. MED. 1470 (2010).
58. Wahl, supra note 1, at 596–98.
59. Id. at 598–601.
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such as background checks, buying a job applicant’s consumer credit
report, or hiring through social network ties. Other influences include
factors that increase a job’s value, such as prolonged unemployment,
household debt, or family size. Even putting these aside, the effect of an
employee-misconduct defense still may be negligible, given that employers
still have multiple avenues of legal recourse to recover for résumé fraud or
other employee misconduct.
Second, even if the defense non-negligibly reduces résumé fraud,
there may be better ways to do so. Instead of the defense, policymakers
could offer subsidies for pre-employment screening, such as a tax credit for
background checks. They could require that all firms in certain industries
perform background checks for certain items, such as felony convictions.
Or they could let employers pass the cost of background checks onto
workers by debiting some or all of that cost from worker wages owed in the
worker’s first pay period.
IV. RESTORATIVE PURPOSE
This Part considers the version of the defense (depicted in Figure 1)
that precludes reinstatement, front pay, and any back pay owed after the
employer discovered the employee’s misconduct. Courts have read the
authority to order back pay, front pay, and reinstatement under various
work-law statutes60 to require that, in any particular case, those remedies
serve the restorative (“remedial” or make-whole) purposes of those laws,61
that is, to restore the worker to the condition he or she would have occupied
if, all else being equal, the employer’s wrongful act had never occurred.
Similarly, under state law governing tort damages, damages for any past
and future pay lost because of a tort generally counts as money awarded to
restore the injured party to the condition he would have occupied absent
that tort.62
60. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (Title
VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006) (ADA).
61. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (Title VII); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941) (NLRA); Republic Steel Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940) (NLRA).
62. 1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.01[1] (2011) (collecting
cases).
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Figure 1: Timeline of Effect of Employee-Misconduct Defense (Remedies)
This Part presents an alternative employee-misconduct defense that
may limit back pay, reinstatement, and front pay in some cases in a way
that serves those remedies’ restorative purposes. This alternative requires
that the employer prove that, had the employer not committed its wrongful
act, it still would have discovered the worker misconduct when it did
(Figure 1: t4) and would have fired that worker for that misconduct.
Before McKennon, some federal courts of appeal had endorsed this
approach to deciding back pay relief in Title VII and ADEA cases, albeit
not for reinstatement or front pay.63 McKennon rejected this approach in
favor of a defense that does not turn on when, if ever, the employer would
have discovered that misconduct but for the employer’s wrongful act.
Because of this feature, the McKennon approach contravenes the
restorative (make-whole) aims of these remedies.
A. The Restorative-Purpose Rationale: Back Pay
The employee-misconduct defense contravenes back pay’s restorative
aims. For a back pay award to restore, the size of the award must only
equal the pay that the employer’s wrongful act caused the worker to lose.
This requires estimating the plaintiff-worker’s what-if pay, i.e., the pay she
would have received if, all else being equal, the employer had not
committed its wrongful act. The employee-misconduct defense, however,
precludes back pay for the time after the employer discovered the
misconduct as a matter of law. The defense thereby forces judges and
juries to assume that the employer’s wrongful act did not substantially
affect the odds of misconduct discovery in cases where evidence suggests
63. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d. Cir. 1994), vacated,
514 U.S. 1034 (1995); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992),
vacated in relevant part, 62 F.3d 374, 380 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see Brief of
Petitioner, McKennon, 1994 WL 385636, at *35–36 (same).
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that this assumption is implausible or false. Therefore, in those cases, our
estimate of plaintiff’s what-if pay is invalid and biased downward. Indeed,
even if this assumption is usually warranted, at best it supports a rebuttable
presumption, not an evidence-invariant one.
This analysis turns on how we estimate a worker’s what-if pay. We
estimate her what-if pay by calculating the average actual pay of
comparator-workers. Comparator-workers are workers that share all the
plaintiff’s pay-relevant characteristics (including that the employer treated
them the same as the plaintiff in all pay-relevant respects), except that they
did not suffer from the employer’s wrongful act. Here are three
illustrations. Each assumes we know the plaintiff’s what-if wage rate and
focuses on the plaintiff’s what-if time worked.
First, sometime after the plaintiff’s firing, the employer shuts down
the plant and fires all the remaining workers there. Here, for any set of
comparator-workers, we can calculate the actual average number of
workdays after the date of the plaintiff’s firing. That number, however,
cannot exceed the total number of workdays between that firing and the
plant shutdown. For that reason, that latter number is the estimated
maximum number of plaintiff’s what-if workdays past the firing.64
Second, after a wrongful firing, a worker injures his back. Had he not
been fired, the back injury would have caused him to miss a certain number
of paid workdays before he would have been physically able to do the job
again. The plaintiff’s back pay award, therefore, must be reduced to
account for the plaintiff’s what-if number of workdays missed while
injured. To estimate this what-if number, one could, in theory, assemble a
set of comparator-workers and calculate the average number of workdays
that they actually missed. This will be hard to do if back injuries are rare.
Moreover, there are many hard-to-see differences between how the
plaintiff’s body suffers and heals from the injury as compared to the bodies
of possible comparators. Instead, there are other approaches, such as
substituting a doctor’s professional judgment as to when the effects of the
back injury disappeared from the work-relevant features of the plaintiff’s
actual body.
Third, an employer imposes drug tests upon all its workers at regular
intervals. The plaintiff-worker secretly smoked marijuana at work on
Monday morning. He is wrongfully fired that day, before his scheduled
drug test on that Friday along with all the other workers. Here, the number
of the plaintiff’s what-if workdays past Monday is estimated by the average
number of workdays past Monday for a set of comparator-workers. To be
64. Bales v. N.L.R.B, 914 F.2d 92, 94–95 (6th Cir. 1990); N.L.R.B. v. Master Slack
&/or Master Trousers Corp., 773 F.2d 77, 83–85 (6th Cir. 1985); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708
F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983) (ADEA).
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comparators, these other workers must share all the plaintiff’s pay-relevant
characteristics, except for the wrongful firing, but including that they also
smoked marijuana on Monday and were also scheduled for an employer
drug test on Friday. If, on average, those comparator-workers actually
failed the Friday drug test, and those who failed were fired that same day,
then we infer that the plaintiff has no what-if workdays beyond Friday.
Again, in practice, comparator-workers will be hard to find if, for
example, none of plaintiff’s now-former co-employees had smoked
marijuana at work that Monday. Here, too, there are acceptable substitutes,
such as judging how consistently company drug tests were performed at
their scheduled times in the recent past, the incidence of false negatives in
those tests, how often in the past this employer has reacted to a positive test
result by firing the worker immediately, and the average time between
positive drug test and firing.
In these three examples, an event (plant shutdown, back injury,
positive drug test) affects the odds that a plaintiff’s comparator-workers
occupy a pay-relevant state or experience a pay-relevant change, which in
turn affects their average actual pay. From their average actual pay, we
infer plaintiff’s what-if pay. The plant shutdown affected the odds that
those workers would stop receiving pay thereafter, though that pay change
was not certain to occur in every case.65 The back injury affected the odds
that, in any particular workday thereafter, the average comparator-worker
could put his body to its job-required uses. The positive drug test affected
the odds that the average comparator-worker who had smoked marijuana
would be fired.
In each example, we assumed that the odds of these events (plant
shutdown, injury, positive drug test) are the same in both a world where the
employer’s wrongful act occurred and in a world where it did not, all else
being equal. This is critical. If the employer’s wrongful act did affect the
odds of the event, then that act thereby influenced the average actual pay of
our comparator-workers. If so, their average actual pay cannot be a valid
estimate of the plaintiff’s what-if pay, because that is, by definition, what
the plaintiff would have been paid had the employer’s wrongful act never
happened.
In some cases, it is an error to assume that the employer’s wrongful
act and the subsequent pay-changing event are independent of each other.
For example, in a wrongful denial of a promotion to a new job, if the new
job has a far lower injury rate, then the employer’s wrongful act may have
65. E.g., Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1110 (8th Cir. 1982)
(remanding for jury to decide in ADEA suit that back pay period did not stop when plant
shut down because employer would have retained plaintiff to work at one of its other
plants).
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increased the odds of a physical injury, and thus the number of missed
workdays.66 Or, in cases where the discharged employee’s lawsuit
motivated an investigation in which the employer discovered the
employee’s pre-discharge misconduct, there may be good reason to believe
that, absent the employer’s wrongful discharge, there would have been no
lawsuit, and thus a far lower chance that the employer would have
discovered the misconduct.
Instead of so assuming in cases where that assumption is implausible,
judges and legislatures need only require the employer raising the defense
to prove that, absent the employer’s wrongful act, the employer would still
have discovered the misconduct when it did and would have fired the
employee for that misconduct at that time. The McKennon Court, however,
rejected this approach. It reasoned that the restorative aim of compensation
is
difficult to apply with precision where there is after-acquired
evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to termination on
legitimate grounds had the employer known about it. Once an
employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a
legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore
the information, even if it is acquired during the course of
discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the
information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit.67
The Court, however, never explained what was “difficult” or why the
employer should not have to prove that it would have discovered the
misconduct “even if” the illegal firing and subsequent lawsuit had not
occurred.
In defending the version of the defense later adopted in McKennon,
White and Brussack (1993) rejected as “wrong” a lower court approach to
Title VII back pay that also required that, but for its wrongful act, the
employer still would have discovered the misconduct.68 They reasoned that
anyone thinking about filing an employment discrimination lawsuit “must
weigh the risk that the defendant will uncover, in preparing for trial,
information about the plaintiff that triggers a discharge policy. There is
nothing inherently illegitimate about an employer’s acquisition of such
66. E.g., Wells v. N.C. Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983)
(holding that back pay award for employer refusal to promote in violation of Title VII
includes period after plaintiff suffered back injury, because “[h]ad he not been wrongfully
denied that promotion to relatively light work, it may reasonably be inferred that he would
not have suffered an injury to his back or that any back problem would have been less
severe.”).
67. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995) (emphasis
added).
68. White & Brussack, supra note 1, at 84.
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information through pretrial discovery or through its own pretrial
investigation.”69
This reasoning is opaque as well. That there is such a risk of
misconduct-discovery does not explain why, in such cases, section 706(g)
of Title VII ought to be read to limit back pay in the way McKennon read
section 7(b) of the ADEA. Perhaps they meant that a court should always
act as if a worker who sues her employer has assumed the risk that her
lawsuit will cause the employer to discover her pre-termination
misconduct70 in a permissible way. However, “assumed-the-risk” is just
another legal conclusion in need of a reason that matters more than back
pay’s restorative purposes. That reason is not self-evident.
On the other hand, if an employer shows that it would still have
discovered the misconduct when it did and would have fired the employee
for that misconduct at that time, full back pay contravenes the restorative
purpose of back pay awards. To the contrary, Corbett (1996) argued that
full back pay in such cases would nonetheless “be more consistent with the
broader goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace” and that “any
approach that cuts off backpay before judgment . . . interfere[s] with the
deterrence objective of the statutes” by encouraging employers to “creat[e]
opportunities for employees to make misrepresentations on employment
documents,” routinely search for them, and have “a low threshold for
discharge.”71
The error here is that once courts read a line between restoration and
punishment into work law remedies, a deterrence rationale alone cannot
justify crossing that line in any particular class of cases. Back pay is a
restorative (make-whole) remedy that may also deter. A deterrence
rationale alone proves too much, because it also justifies double or treble
back pay, or any award that makes the plaintiff better off than she would
have been absent the employer’s wrongful act. In this respect, a restoration
(make-whole) purpose of a statute restricts what might be otherwise
69. Id.
70. Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Law of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment
Discrimination Cases: Clarification of the Employer’s Burden, Remedial Guidance, and the
Enigma of Post-Termination Misconduct, 65 UMKC L. REV. 159, 163 (1996) (adopting this
reading).
71. Corbett, supra note 1, at 370–71 (footnote omitted). Corbett also argued that full
back pay compensates a discrimination plaintiff for “psychological injury” under statutes,
such as the ADEA, that authorize back pay but not emotional-suffering damages. Id. at
369–70 & n. 335. (Title VII is not such a statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) – (3)
(2006)). This presumes that, by not authorizing damages for emotional harm, such statutes
contravene their restorative purposes to an extent partially corrected by an otherwise over-
compensatory award of full back pay. This argument, however, proves too much, because it
applies to any limitation on, or offset against, back pay awarded under such statutes.
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implied from that same statute’s deterrence purpose.72
Accordingly, suppose Corbett can prove that “in most cases, the
employer would not have discovered the after-acquired evidence absent its
illegal acts and the ensuing litigation.”73 Even if so, such proof does not
necessarily imply that courts ought to deny the employer the opportunity to
prove in any particular case that it would have discovered the misconduct
in any event.
Similarly, a deterrence statutory purpose cannot alone or necessarily
justify a more stringent standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing) for
the defense.74 To the contrary, that purpose makes the defense consistent
with the many other remedy restrictions that also undermine deterrence and
advance a restorative purpose but are subject to a less stringent proof
standard (e.g., preponderance of the evidence).75
B. Reinstatement and Front Pay
The same basic argument extends to reinstatement and front pay.
Their restorative purpose requires denying those remedies if, at a time on or
before final judgment, the plaintiff would not have been working for that
employer, even absent the employer’s wrongful act.76 Put differently, we
are concerned here with plaintiff’s what-if employment status before final
judgment (Figure 1: t3 < x ≤ t5).
To illustrate, again suppose that, before final judgment, the employer
shut down the plant and fired everyone. If so, then at the time of final
72. Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940) (rejecting as
“prov[ing] too much” a deterrent-effect argument for particular NLRB requirements as
“sufficient” to sustain a Board order, because, if so, the NLRB “would be free to set up any
system of penalties which it would deem adequate to that end”); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (inferring from Title VII’s legislative history that
“backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate
the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination”) (emphasis added).
73. Corbett, supra note 1, at 369 (footnote omitted).
74. But see Sprang, supra note 1, at 157–58. In contrast, the South Carolina Supreme
Court adopted a clear-and-convincing standard for employee-misconduct defense to contract
liability in order to discourage “less-than-principled employers (or their attorneys)” who
otherwise, because of the defense, “may be tempted to ‘rummage the file’ in order to
‘discover’ any and all evidence that would permit them to escape liability.” Lewis v. Fisher
Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 445 (S.C. 1998). The worry here appears to be the risk of
employer retaliatory use of the defense. See infra Part VIII.B.
75. E.g., Fleming v. Cnty. of Kane, 898 F.2d 553, 560 (7th Cir. 1990) (Title VII
damages mitigation defense).
76. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming denial
of permanent reinstatement based on the inference, from jury damages award for one year’s
salary, that plaintiff would not have been working for her employer past one year).
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judgment, we can observe that the average comparator-worker no longer
works for that employer. From this, we infer that plaintiff’s what-if
employment status would have also been the same at that time.
Similarly, suppose the employer shows that, absent its wrongful act, it
would have discovered the plaintiff’s misconduct and fired the plaintiff for
that misconduct before final judgment (Figure 1: t4 < x ≤ t5). If so, then it
has by definition shown that plaintiff’s what-if employment status on or
before final judgment is that he no longer worked for that employer, and
therefore reinstatement should be denied.
The same analysis applies to front pay. A front pay award is supposed
to equal the present value of future pay that the worker was reasonably
certain to have received after final judgment, but for the employer’s
wrongful act. Some work laws authorize front pay in lieu of reinstatement
in cases where reinstatement is warranted but impossible or impractical.77
Yet, loss of future earnings (i.e., front pay) is also a standard item of
damages under state tort law,78 while reinstatement is disfavored if the
damages remedy is deemed adequate.
Regardless of any legal presumption for or against reinstatement over
front pay, once the employer can show that, absent its wrongful act, it
would have discovered the plaintiff’s misconduct and fired the plaintiff for
that misconduct before final judgment (Figure 1: t4 < x ≤ t5), then it has by
definition shown that plaintiff’s what-if employment status on or before
final judgment is that he no longer worked for that employer. For that
reason, plaintiff’s what-if front pay is zero. Alternatively, if the employer
can show that, absent its wrongful act, it would have discovered the
plaintiff’s misconduct and fired the plaintiff for that misconduct at some
point after final judgment (Figure 1: t6), then plaintiff’s front pay period
ends on that future date.79
77. See, e.g., Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 853–54 (2001)
(§ 706(g) of Title VII); id. at 849 (NLRA § 10(c)); Gilliland v. Mo. Athletic Club, 273
S.W.3d 516, 524 (Mo. 2009) (Missouri Human Rights Act); Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining,
Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791, 813 (W. Va. 2009) (finding that a state statute prohibited
discrimination for seeking or receiving workers’ compensation benefits).
78. E.g., Cates v. Brown, 645 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Ark. 1983); see generally 2 NATES ET
AL., supra note 62, § 10.02.
79. The front pay period ends at the future date at which, had he could have been
reinstated, the worker would have found comparable employment elsewhere, see Williams
v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 1998), or at the date of some other event,
independent of the employer’s wrongful act, that would have caused employment to cease,
see, e.g., Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 402 (5th Cir. 2002) (closing of
business unit); Schick v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2002)
(prison; Title VII); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1990) (physical
disability; ADEA); Floca v. Homcare Health Servs., Inc., 845 F.2d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 1988)
(school; Title VII).
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Here, too, we presume that the odds of the employment-status-relevant
event (plant shutdown, misconduct-discovery) are the same in both a world
where the employer’s wrongful act occurred and in the counterfactual
world where it did not, all else being equal. If absent the employer’s
wrongful act, the employer likely never would have discovered the
misconduct, then it likely would not have fired the plaintiff for that
misconduct. If, however, the employer’s wrongful act influenced the odds
that the employer discovered the employee’s misconduct, then the
employer’s wrongful act would also influence the average comparator-
worker’s employment status at the time of final judgment, in turn making it
an invalid basis for estimating plaintiff’s what-if employment status.
The McKennon approach, however, precludes reinstatement and front
pay only on a showing that, had it known of the misconduct at the time of
discharge, the employer would have fired the employee for that misconduct
at that time. Its reason: “It would be both inequitable and pointless to
order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated,
and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.”80
This is terse. Based on the phrase “would have terminated . . . in any
event and upon lawful grounds,” we can read it at least to make this
argument: once the employer shows that it would have fired the employee
for misconduct at the time of discharge (Figure 1: t3) had it known of the
misconduct at that time, that showing necessarily implies that, even absent
the employer’s wrongful act, the employer would and could by law have
fired the employee when it actually learned of his misconduct (Figure 1: t4
≤ x ≤ t5). However, as discussed above, this simply does not hold in cases
where, absent the employer’s wrongful act, the employer likely would not
have discovered the misconduct at all.
V. THE AUTHORITY TO FIRE
This Part shows the errors committed by basing the employee-
misconduct defense on the employer’s legal authority to fire a worker.
Courts and commentators have suggested that by precluding reinstatement,
front pay, and full back pay, the defense expresses proper regard for
employer discretion to fire or otherwise discipline employees for
misconduct. For example, the McKennon Court emphasized that, in
deciding ADEA remedies, “the employee’s wrongdoing becomes
relevant . . . to take due account of the lawful prerogatives of the employer
in the usual course of its business and the corresponding equities that it has
80. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
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arising from the employee’s wrongdoing.”81 Similarly, in applying the
McKennon approach to limit relief in wrongful discharge claims under state
tort law, the New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote that it “properly
balances the employee’s entitlement to a remedy as a result of the
employer’s tortious conduct with an employer’s interest in lawfully
managing its business affairs.”82
The problem is that courts use the idiom of balance, regard, or respect,
instead of specifying how precisely barring remedies otherwise available to
the worker under law X is justified by employer discretion to fire for
misconduct afforded by some other law (law Y). Perhaps law Y imposes a
duty that in every case justifies, precludes, or limits relief otherwise
available under law X. This could also happen by operation of preemption
doctrine or to harmonize the purposes of laws X and Y, where X and Y are
two laws of equal priority (e.g., two federal statutes or two state common
law precedents). For example, where a worker’s misconduct pertains to job
qualifications required by statute, some courts have treated the issue as one
of harmonizing that statute with the statute authorizing the worker’s suit.83
If not, perhaps the exercise of employer discretion afforded by law Y
advances some public good that aligns with or trumps the restorative
purposes of remedies otherwise due under law X in every such case. For
example, remedial authority under the NLRA section 10(c), as codified,
covers “such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the purposes of this
subchapter.”84 Similarly, remedial authority under section 706(g) of Title
VII covers “such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”85 One could
argue that employer discretion to fire workers afforded under, say,
Missouri law advances a particular public good; that such advancement
counts as a “purpose[]” of the NLRA or counts as “appropriate” under Title
VII; and that this public good would not be as well advanced by awarding
the remedies otherwise due under the NLRA or Title VII, respectively.
In contrast, just expressing regard or respect for such employer
discretion is unhelpful. It is not an argument, but a placeholder for one. It
81. Id. at 361.
82. McDill v. Environamics Corp., 757 A.2d 162, 166 (N.H. 2000).
83. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002)
(NLRA and federal immigration law); Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 750 A.2d 73, 76
(N.J. 2000) (state employment discrimination statute and state statute barring plaintiff’s
employment because of his prior bribery conviction); Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471
(N.J. App. Div. 2004) (state employment discrimination statute and federal immigration
law). But cf. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1171.5(b) (West 2011) (making a person’s immigration
status, “[f]or purposes of enforcing state labor and employment laws . . . irrelevant to the
issue of liability”).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
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does not identify the public good in question. It does not show how such
employer discretion advances that public good. And it does not show how
denying remedies otherwise due in such cases (here, under the NLRA or
Title VII) promotes that public good to such an extent as to align with or
trump the restorative aims of those remedies.
At best, courts and commentators have argued that it would be
pointless to award reinstatement, front pay, or full back pay, because if the
employee is reinstated either voluntarily or by court order, the employer
would and could by law immediately fire that employee for having
committed its pre-reinstatement misconduct. The rest of this Part identifies
the errors or unsupported premises upon which these arguments rest.
A. Prospective Firing after Reinstatement
The McKennon opinion offered a reinstate-and-fire rationale for
precluding reinstatement and front pay: “It would be both inequitable and
pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer . . . will
terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.”86 This sentence seems to
make this argument: once the employer shows that it would have fired the
employee for misconduct at the time of discharge (Figure 1: t3) had it
known of the misconduct at that time, that showing necessarily implies that
if the court orders reinstatement, then, after final judgment (Figure 1: x >
t5), the employer would and could by law immediately fire the newly-
reinstated employee because of her past misconduct.
Here is the error: in cases where a court finds an employee suitable
for reinstatement despite his misconduct, the reinstatement order is not
pointless just because, under other laws, the employer may fire the
reinstated employee for his pre-reinstatement misconduct. Usually, a court
rejects arguments that a person’s act has not violated this law simply
because that act did not also violate that law. The reinstatement order itself
has the force of law by operation of the legal authority under which the
court issued it, such as section 706(g) of Title VII, or NLRA section 10(c).
If an employer’s action violates this order (this law), it does not matter
whether some other law permits that action, such as state law governing
employment contracts, unless that other law supplants or restricts the legal
authority to order reinstatement in the particular case.
Rather, the question is this: if an employer immediately fires the
reinstated employee for reasons that the court has already rejected as
grounds for denying reinstatement, has the employer violated the
86. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995); accord
O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 797–98 (Ariz. 1998).
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reinstatement order itself? To illustrate, suppose that, pursuant to section
706(g) of Title VII, a trial judge orders reinstatement, and in doing so
writes an opinion that expressly rejects the employer’s argument that the
worker’s pre-termination misconduct (discovered post-termination) suffices
to deny reinstatement. To underscore this rejection, the trial judge includes
as part of the reinstatement order a provision barring the employer from
firing the reinstated employee solely because of his pre-termination
misconduct. The judge does this to prevent the employer from using its
authority to fire to accomplish in effect what it could not persuade the trial
judge to do in the first place: deny reinstatement because of the pre-
termination misconduct. This provision, no less than the rest of the order,
has the force of law of section 706(g), and therefore supplants state law that
otherwise permits the employer to immediately fire that reinstated
employee for that misconduct.
If so, when a Title VII reinstatement order lacks such an express
provision, can a judge read such a provision as implied when the order is
issued under the same circumstances? For example, a judge might so read
the order by pointing to other boilerplate language in the order, such as that
the defendant obey the order consistent with the court opinion setting forth
the reasons for granting reinstatement in that case. The point is that
whether a judge reads the order in this way does not turn on the state law
that otherwise authorizes the employer to fire its workers.
For the fire-after-reinstating rationale to nonetheless justify denying
reinstatement as a matter of law, one must elide the differences between
three separate inquiries: (1) whether the employer would have fired the
employee at the time of discharge solely because of his misconduct, had it
known of that misconduct; (2) if the court orders reinstatement, whether the
employer would, if it could, immediately fire that reinstated employee
solely because of his misconduct; and (3) whether the employee is
objectively unsuitable to be reinstated because of his misconduct.
First, the fire-after-reinstating rationale assumes that, if the employer
can show that it would have fired the employee at the time of discharge
solely because of its misconduct, had it known of that misconduct, that
showing necessarily proves that, if the court orders reinstatement, that
employer would, if it could, immediately fire the employee after
reinstatement because of that misconduct. The former refers to a
counterfactual past (Figure 1: t3) while the latter refers to a potential future
in which the judge had ordered reinstatement (Figure 1: x ≥ t5). In the
interim, however, conditions can change, such as changes in employer
policy or management personnel, or a change in law, that makes it less
likely that, because of the misconduct, the employer would fire the
employee after reinstatement. In such cases, by precluding reinstatement
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as a matter of law, the employee-misconduct defense requires judges to
assume a future state of the world that is now less likely to occur.
Instead, a court can simply ask the employer to separately show that it
would, if it could, immediately fire the reinstated employee because of his
past misconduct. Actually proving this, however, may not be easy. By the
time the worker has prevailed and the trial judge is considering whether to
order reinstatement, there may be a rather large set of causes for why, at
that time, the employer wants, if it can, to fire the employee if reinstated.
The employer may be angry with the plaintiff-employee for committing the
misconduct and worried that, if reinstated, the plaintiff will do it again, or
something worse. The employer may be angry just because the plaintiff
sued, let alone because she sued and won. Or the employer may want to
fire, because the prevailing market wage for the employee’s former job has
dropped, whereas reinstatement would commit the employer to paying the
plaintiff’s former higher wage.
Second, even if an employer shows that it would, if it could,
immediately fire the reinstated employee because of his past misconduct,
that showing does not necessarily establish that the employee is objectively
unsuitable to be reinstated. Reinstatement usually does not depend on what
the employer wants. For example, if an employer opposes reinstatement
because of expected workplace antagonism, such antagonism must go
beyond the employer hostility that usually results when a worker has filed a
lawsuit against it and prevailed, lest such hostility, precisely because it is so
typical, bar reinstatement in virtually every case.87 The emphasis is usually
not on what an employer wants, but on what a court can infer from the
nature of the employee’s misconduct as to how that employee will behave
if reinstated.
To illustrate, compare the NLRA’s employee-misconduct defense
(discussed above in Part I(A)) with how the NLRB decides reinstatement in
cases of post-termination misconduct, i.e., where the worker commits the
misconduct after the firing, not before, and then the employer learns of it.
In such cases, the NLRB denies reinstatement only “in those flagrant cases
in which the misconduct is violent or of such character as to render the
employees unfit for further service.”88
In cases of credible threats of physical violence against a supervisor or
87. See, e.g., Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 862 (7th Cir. 2001) (Title
VII); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1138–39 (8th Cir. 1981) (Title VII);
Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc. v. D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 917 A.2d 1094, 1106 (D.C.
2007) (D.C. Human Rights Act); Sands v. Menard, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 384, 394 (Wis. 2010)
(arbitration of Equal Pay Act and Title VII claims).
88. JCO Food Corp. (C-Town), 281 N.L.R.B. 458, 458 (1986) (footnote and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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co-employee, let alone actual violence, this standard can be easily
satisfied.89 Not all post-termination disparaging statements about the
employer, however, satisfy this test, because “it is wholly natural for an
employee to react with some vehemence to an unlawful discharge.”90 The
premise is that reinstatement does not trigger any equivalent anger, making
similar employer disparagement less likely after reinstatement. Even when
the employee lies under oath in an NLRB proceeding against the employer,
the NLRB does not categorically preclude reinstatement for that
misconduct. Rather, in such cases, the NLRB considers, among other
things, whether such false testimony shows that she is unfit for
reinstatement.91
In all these cases, the employer opposes reinstatement because of past
misconduct, a credible signal that if it could, it would fire the employee
after reinstatement because of that misconduct. Yet, what the employer
wants and would do, if it could, does not wholly determine whether, despite
the misconduct, the employee should be awarded reinstatement.
The NLRB’s “unfit for further service” approach illustrates that, for
the employee-misconduct defense that denies reinstatement, a fire-after-
reinstating rationale depends on the reason for collapsing the distinction
between what the employer would want and whether the employee is
objectively suitable for reinstatement despite his past misconduct. That
reason is not self-evident. Perhaps misconduct on-the-job implies less
future loyalty or obedience to that employer than post-termination
misconduct. In any particular case, this may be true. But it is not obvious
that inferences of this sort are available in enough cases to warrant
stripping the trial judge of discretion to so infer or not, given the evidence,
when deciding whether to order reinstatement.
Put another way, stripping trial judges of such discretion might be
justified given strong evidence that trial judges often commit a certain kind
of error. That error is finding someone suitable for reinstatement despite
his past misconduct, when (1) in fact that person was later confirmed to be
unsuitable for reinstatement because of his post-reinstatement behavior,
and (2) his past pre-reinstatement misconduct alone well predicted that type
of post-reinstatement behavior.
89. See, e.g., Precision Window Mfg., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 963 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1992);
Alto-Shaam, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1466, 1467 (1992); Hillside Ave. Pharmacy, Inc., 265
N.L.R.B. 1613 (1982).
90. Stephens Media, L.L.C., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 2011 WL 549435, at *2 (Feb. 14,
2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), enforced, Nos. 11–1054, 11–1088,
2012 WL 1372162 (D.C. Cir. April 20, 2012).
91. See, e.g., Owens Ill., Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1193–94 (1988). The NLRA does
not require the NLRB to deny reinstatement in every such case. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 510 U.S. 317, 325 (1994).
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To illustrate, suppose a trial judge finds an employee suitable for
reinstatement despite his theft of office supplies, and rejects the employer’s
argument that the past theft alone indicates that, if reinstated, the employee
will probably steal something from the employer again. After
reinstatement, that employee steals an office computer. If so, one might
conclude that the trial judge had erred in finding reinstatement suitability.
If, however, the reinstated employee had, after reinstatement, sexually
harassed a co-employee, then the judge did not err in finding reinstatement
suitability, provided that an employee’s theft poorly predicts subsequent
sexual harassment by that employee. On the other hand, if employee theft
is a strong predictor of any kind of subsequent serious rule-breaking
behavior, including but not limited to sexual harassment, then the judge did
err in finding reinstatement suitability.
If trial judges commit this error in most cases, then stripping them of
the discretion to reinstate an employee despite his past misconduct has a
benefit: it avoids the social cost of the predicted post-reinstatement
behavior. This benefit might be worth the social cost of removing such
discretion, i.e., denying reinstatement where that employee is in fact
suitable for reinstatement despite past misconduct.
Yet, even given a single metric for measuring those costs and benefits,
the research literature on post-reinstatement outcomes currently provides
little basis to estimate how often such errors would occur in the
reinstatement decisions that trial judges would make but for the employee-
misconduct defense. Most studies in this literature look at samples of labor
arbitration awards in cases where the employee was discharged for
misconduct but the arbitrator substitutes some less severe discipline for the
dismissal. The researchers inquire into, among other things, which
employees agreed to be reinstated (a source of selection bias), how long
after reinstatement the reinstated employee worked, whether that employee
was discharged for cause, and whether the employer was satisfied with that
employee’s post-reinstatement job performance.92 Without better research
on how prone trial judges are to erroneously finding reinstatement
suitability despite past misconduct, it is hard to show that the costs of such
error exceed the benefits of giving trial judges the discretion to decide
reinstatement suitability despite misconduct in the particular case.
92. For reviews of this literature, see Bernard Walker & Robert T. Hamilton,
Employer-Employee Grievances: A Review, 13 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 40, 50–51 (2011);
David Lewin, Unionism and Employment Conflict Resolution: Rethinking Collective Voice
And Its Consequences, 26 J. LAB. RES. 209, 225–26 (2005); and Kelly Williams & Daphne
Gottlieb Taras, Reinstatement in Arbitration: The Grievors’ Perspective, 55 INDUS. REL.
227, 228–31 (2000).
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B. The Voluntarily-Reinstate-and-Fire Rationale for Reducing Back Pay
This section rejects a reinstate-and-fire rationale for why the
employee-misconduct defense should limit back pay. White and Brussack
argued that the defense’s back pay limitation simply replicated what
employers could otherwise secure by strategic use of rules governing how
voluntary reinstatement offers affect Title VII back pay calculation:
“There is nothing to prevent an employer in an after-acquired evidence case
from unilaterally rehiring a discharged plaintiff upon its discovery of the
after-acquired evidence, thus ending the backpay period, and then
immediately discharging the plaintiff on the basis of the after-acquired
evidence.”93
Here is the error: an employer’s voluntary reinstatement offer does
not necessarily end the back pay period. If the employee accepts the offer,
then back pay stops accruing under Title VII and other laws.94 If the
employee rejects the offer, then the back pay period stops at the date of
rejection only if certain conditions are satisfied. In Ford Motor Co. v.
E.E.O.C. (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court read section 706(g) of Title VII
to mean that “absent special circumstances, the rejection of an employer’s
unconditional job offer ends the accrual of potential backpay [Title VII]
liability,”95 provided that the offered job is “substantially equivalent to the
one he was denied” and the rejection of the offer is unreasonable.96 Courts
have adopted or endorsed the Ford Motor rule under various federal and
state laws to determine how rejection of a voluntary reinstatement offer
should affect a plaintiff’s back pay award.97 Similarly, under NLRA
section 10(c), rejection of a reinstatement offer tolls the back pay period,
provided that the offer is specific, unequivocal, unconditional, and offers
full reinstatement to the employee’s former or a substantially equivalent
93. White & Brussack, supra note 1, at 85.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (Title VII); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313
U.S. 177, 198–200 (1941) (NLRA).
95. Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982).
96. Id. at 232.
97. See, e.g., Albert v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs, Inc., 356 F.3d 1242, 1253–54 (10th
Cir. 2004) (ADA); Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc. v. D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 917 A.2d
1094, 1107 (D.C. 2007) (D.C. Human Rights Act); Fair v. Red Lion Inn, 943 P.2d 431, 440
(Colo. 1997) (contract claim under Colorado law); Champion Int’l Corp. v. Wideman, 733
So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (Florida Civil Rights Act); Brady v. Nestor, 496
N.E.2d 148, 151 (Mass. 1986) (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B); Morris v. Clawson Tank Co.,
587 N.W.2d 253, 265 (Mich. 1998) (Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act);
Martinell v. Montana Power Co., 886 P.2d 421, 440 (Mont. 1994) (Montana Human Rights
Act); Dobson v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 422 S.E.2d 494, 502 (W. Va. 1992) (West
Virginia Human Rights Act).
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position.98 Thus, where the Ford Motor rule or its equivalent applies but its
conditions are not satisfied, the plaintiff-employee can reject a voluntary
reinstatement offer without ending the back pay period.
In a voluntarily-reinstate-and-fire case, the Ford Motor rule is unlikely
to be satisfied. That rule at least requires that the job offered be
“substantially equivalent” to the position denied, as opposed to one that
required the employee to “go into another line of work, accept a demotion,
or take a demeaning position.”99 A court is unlikely to find this condition
satisfied for a position about which the employer knows at the time of the
offer that, when the worker accepts, the employer will immediately fire her.
Such a position carries zero promotional opportunities, which matters if the
position denied had at least some prospects for promotion. Its
compensation terms, even if the same on paper, are not equivalent in
practice, given the expected negligible duration of employment. And it is
easy to label such an offered position as objectively “demeaning” to the
worker, and particularly so if the worker does not know at the time of offer
that, if she accepts, the employer intends to immediately fire her.
C. Front Pay
A reinstate-and-fire rationale for precluding front pay simply makes
no sense if the underlying law does not require judges to prefer
reinstatement over front pay as a remedy, for example, under state tort law.
Some state courts, however, have adopted McKennon’s bar against front
pay into their tort law,100 even though the appellate courts in such states
have not declared a tort-remedies rule preferring reinstatement in lieu of
damages for loss of future earnings (front pay).
Under laws preferring reinstatement over front pay as a presumptive
remedy, the reinstate-and-fire rationale cannot be an independent reason for
denying front pay unless it applies in cases where the employee is suited
for reinstatement despite his past misconduct. However, in those cases, if
the employer proves that if it could, it would immediately fire the employee
after reinstatement, such a showing actually justifies awarding front pay
instead. One ground for granting front pay in lieu of reinstatement is that
the degree of continuing employer hostility, or mutual hostility due to the
98. In re Midwestern Pers. Servs, 346 N.L.R.B. 624, 624 (2006), enforced, 508 F.3d
418 (7th Cir. 2007); Mashuda Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 135 F. App’x 574, 581 (4th Cir. 2005);
Halle Enters., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 247 F.3d 268, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2001); N.L.R.B. v. Seligman &
Assoc., 808 F.2d 1155, 1163 (6th Cir. 1986); Standard Aggregate Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 154,
154 (1974).
99. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231–32.
100. See supra note 26 (citing cases).
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lawsuit, has rendered a productive and amicable working relationship
impossible or impractical.101 In those cases, the employer’s would-have-
fired showing helps prove that there is enough hostility to preclude a
productive and amicable working relationship after reinstatement.102
VI. CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND UNCLEAN HANDS
This Part considers three justifications for an employee-misconduct
defense to liability. The first two claim fidelity to two distinct contract
principles in order to justify the employee-misconduct defense as a defense
to contract liability: (1) material breach by one party permits the
counterparty to cancel its remaining contractual duties; and (2) if a party’s
misrepresentation induces the counter-party to assent to a contract, such
contract is voidable by the counterparty. Either principle affords a party
the right on those grounds to cancel or rescind the contract, respectively.
This section also considers justifications based on the unclean hands
doctrine, traditionally an equitable defense to remedies generally.
Each of these three rationales rests on a traditional common law
defense that requires judges or juries to do something other than predict
what the employer would have done at the time of its wrongful act had it
known of the employee’s misconduct. If case outcomes are the same
nevertheless, then it is unclear why courts should adopt a specially
designated employee-misconduct defense at all, as opposed to letting
employers plead these traditional common law defenses in their existing
doctrinal form. If, however, the prevailing would-have-fired variant of the
defense leads to different case outcomes, then what needs justifying are
those features of the employee-misconduct defense that differ from what
each state’s material-breach, fraudulent-inducement, or unclean-hands
doctrines generally require.
A. Material Nonperformance
Every state’s contract law assumes that every contract contains “a
condition of each party’s remaining duties to render performances to be
exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured
101. See, e.g., Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1176 (10th Cir. 2003)
(Title VII and ADEA); Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir. 2002) (ADA);
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (ADEA); Sands v.
Menard, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 384, 394–96 (Wis. 2010) (arbitral order).
102. This reasoning does not apply in cases of post-termination misconduct in which the
employee strategically committed the misconduct in order to make reinstatement untenable
and thus obtain front pay, because the plaintiff could thereby escape the intended effect of
any rule preferring reinstatement over front pay as a remedy.
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material failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an
earlier time.”103 If such “material” nonperformance occurs, the non-
breaching party may elect to seek, instead of contract damages, the
discharge of all its remaining contractual duties. For this rule, it does not
matter if the non-breaching party was unaware of the other party’s material
non-performance.104
State contract law, however, varies in how a court must decide
whether material breach has occurred. Some state courts provide that a
breach is material only if it is severe enough to defeat the “primary,”
“essential,” or “root” purpose of the parties in making the contract.105
Other state courts106 have adopted or relied on the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 241, which identifies five “significant” types of non-dispositive
circumstances or factors to consider.107
Both these approaches diverge from the prevailing employee-
misconduct defense, which focuses solely on predicting whether the
employer would have fired the employee for misconduct had it known of
the misconduct at the time of discharge.108 In contrast, in deciding the
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1981). For cases recognizing this
rule, see 14 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 43:5 (4th ed. 2000).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237, cmt. c, illus. 8 (1981). Courts have
applied the material breach rule to excuse an employee’s duties under a non-compete clause
of an employment contract where the employer had earlier breached that contract by firing
that employee. E.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1983); Ward v. Am. Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 443 N.E.2d 1342, 1343 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983); McKnight v. Midwest Eye
Inst. of Kansas City, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 909, 915–17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see Schuermann v.
Am. KA-RO Corp., 367 S.E.2d 159 (S.C. 1988) (demonstrating that termination for cause
permits employer to abandon non-competition clause under which employer had, in
exchange for that clause, agreed to pay seventy-five percent of the monthly salary for two
years).
105. E.g., Coors v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 112 P.3d 59, 64 (Colo. 2005);
Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 137 P.3d 409, 415 (Idaho 2006); Ferrara v.
Walters, 919 So.2d 876, 886 (Miss. 2005); R.C. Hobbs Enters., v. J.G.L. Distrib. Inc., 104
P.3d 503, 508 (Mont. 2004); Horton v. Horton, 487 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Va. 1997).
106. E.g., Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 141 P.3d 705, 713 (Wyo. 2006); Mustang
Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Tex. 2004).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981). In employment contract
cases, some state courts have referred to or relied on some or all of the Restatement factors,
with varying precision. See, e.g., Nat’l Propane Corp. v. Miller, 18 P.3d 782, 787 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2000); Shah v. Cover-It, Inc., 859 A.2d 959, 963–64 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); Circle
Sec. Agency, Inc. v. Ross, 437 N.E.2d 667, 673-74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Stokes v. Enmark
Collaborative, 634 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kersh v. Montgomery
Developmental Ctr., 519 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Grant v. Laughlin Envtl.,
Inc., No. 01-07-00227-CV, 2009 WL 7936382009, at *10 (Tex. App. Mar. 26, 2009); see
also Virendra S. Bisla, M.D., Ltd. v. Parvaiz, 884 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
(prescribing factors that overlap with Restatement factors).
108. O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795–96 (Ariz. 1998);
McDill v. Environamics Corp., 757 A.2d 162, 166 (N.H. 2000); Teter v. Republic Parking
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material breach question, state courts do not ask the finder of fact to
proceed exclusively from the employer’s point of view. Given this
difference, in at least some cases, applying a material breach rule may lead
to different case outcomes than the employee-misconduct defense’s would-
have-fired approach. If so, it is not clear what justifies departing from the
applicable material breach rule for employment contracts, while continuing
to apply that rule for other kinds of contracts. If not, then it is unclear why
employers should not have to raise and satisfy the material breach rule in
its existing doctrinal form in order to defeat workers’ contract claims.
B. Inducement by Misrepresentation
An employee-misconduct defense to contract liability can also be
derived from the state contract law rule that permits rescission where one
party’s misrepresentations induced the other to assent to the contract. The
Restatement formulation, roughly mirroring state contract law,109 provides:
“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a
material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is
justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.”110 Once
voidable, the induced party can choose either to rescind its contractual
duties, or ratify the contract nonetheless, thereby extinguishing its option to
rescind.111 In suits by employers, courts have sometimes granted rescission
of employment contracts based on employee misrepresentations at the time
of hire.112 And in workers’ contract claims against employers, some courts
have also recognized a rescission defense to contract liability under
employment contracts based on worker misrepresentations at the time of
hire.113
Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 340 (Tenn. 2005).
109. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(1) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-4-60 (West
2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1711(1) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-09-02(1)
(2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 233(1) (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-11-2(1)
(2011); Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 182 P.3d 1079, 1094 (Alaska 2008);
Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 172 P.3d 1021, 1032 (Haw.
2007); J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (Nev.
2004); ABM Farms, Inc. v. Woods, 692 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Ohio 1998); Miller v. Celebration
Mining Co., 29 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Utah 2001); Sarvis v. Vt. State Colls., 772 A.2d 494, 498–
99 (Vt. 2001).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981). To be material, the
misrepresentation must have “substantially contribute[d] to his decision to manifest his
assent.” Id. § 167.
111. Id. § 7.
112. E.g., Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale, 432 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1981).
113. See, e.g., Hampton v. Sandy Cowen Agency, Inc., 739 P.2d 1331, 1331–32 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987); Fuller v. DePaul Univ., 12 N.E.2d 213, 215–16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938); see
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Rescission, however, requires restitution, that is, substantially
restoring both parties to the positions they would have occupied had the
transaction not occurred. In employment contracts, an employer receives,
and the worker provides, the benefit of the worker’s services, which usually
cannot be easily given or taken back so as to restore both employer and
worker to their pre-agreement positions. Accordingly, in some states,
rescission of employment contracts entails an inquiry into the reasonable
value of those services (often the market wage), payment of which
accomplishes the necessary restitution. For example, some state courts
have declared that if an employer discharges a worker in breach of a fixed-
duration employment contract before the worker has fully performed, the
discharged worker can elect to rescind the contract and sue in quantum
meruit to recover the reasonable value of services rendered to the
employer.114
In contract cases where the employer relies on résumé fraud as a
defense to liability, why should the defense’s would-have-fired approach
supplant existing state contract law authorizing contract rescission based on
misrepresentations at the time of hire? A would-have-fired showing can
help prove that the worker’s misrepresentation “induced” the employer to
hire the worker, or that a (non-fraudulent) misrepresentation is “material,”
but that showing itself need not be required. And while proving justifiable
reliance sometimes requires that the recipient of the misrepresentation had
tried to verify that misrepresentation, that duty to investigate usually does
not apply to statements of fact where the fact in question is within the
peculiar knowledge of the person making the representation.115 This
applies to résumé fraud, because the job applicant’s criminal record, past
work experience, and educational degrees, are all usually items of
also Morgan v. Am. Univ., 534 A.2d 323, 329–31 (D.C. 1987) (affirming jury finding that
contract language did not abrogate employer right of rescission based on employee’s
omission, at time of hire and subsequent reappointments, that he was simultaneously
working for another university).
114. City of Anniston v. Douglas, 34 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1948); Oliver v. Campbell,
273 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954) (attorney-client); Burritt v. Media Mktg Servs., Inc., 420 S.E.2d
792, 795 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Milage v. Woodward, 78 N.E. 873 (N.Y. 1906); Wegman v.
Dairylea Co-op., Inc., 50 A.D.2d 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1975). But see Great
Harbour Cay Realty & Inv. Co. v. Carnes, 862 So. 2d 63, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(affirming dismissal of employer’s fraudulent-inducement counterclaim against former
employee based on résumé fraud, because the employer could not show “rescission [sic] . . .
being applied in an employment contract situation”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1981) (“The injured party has no right to restitution if he has
performed all of his duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains
due other than payment of a definite sum of money for that performance.”)
115. E.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1959); Porreco v.
Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 571 (Pa. 2002).
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information within the job applicant’s peculiar knowledge. In general, if
case outcomes are unlikely to vary much under either approach, then
adopting the employee-misconduct defense requires explaining why state
contract law should treat employment contract claims differently from
other contract claims against which the employer can argue fraudulent-
inducement.
C. Fraudulent Inducement as a Statutory Bar
A fraudulent-inducement argument might preclude liability under
work law statutes if those statutes require a contract between worker and
employer that is or could have been valid and enforceable at common law
at the time of the employer’s wrongful act. For example, some courts have
read the statutory term “employee” in a state’s workers’ compensation
statute, often defined to include a “contract for hire, express or implied,”116
to require a valid contract in existence between worker and employer, at the
time of the worker’s injury, for the statute to apply.117 The South Carolina
Supreme Court, for example, grounded its judicially-declared false-
statement defense to workers’ compensation liability by reasoning that an
injured worker cannot be an “employee” at the time of injury under the
state’s workers’ compensation statute if that worker had committed
fraudulent inducement at the time of hire.118
Two hurdles face this kind of argument. First, fraudulent-inducement
typically renders a contract voidable, not void. This leaves the contract
enforceable at common law unless the defrauded party rescinds the contract
and provides restitution.119 Courts have addressed this hurdle in different
ways.
For example, when a claimant argued, on that basis, that the employer
had to affirmatively rescind the contract to avail itself of the false-statement
defense under South Carolina’s workers’ compensation statute, the South
116. MODERN WORKERS COMP. § 106:2 (2011) (compiling statutes).
117. E.g., Spikes v. State, 458 A.2d 672, 674 (R.I. 1983).
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130 (2011); Brayboy v. WorkForce, 681 S.E.2d 567, 568–
69 (S.C. 2009); Cooper v. McDevitt & St. Co., 196 S.E.2d 833, 834 (S.C. 1973). Similarly,
some courts have also declared that employers have a fraudulent-inducement ground for
seeking rescission of an employee benefit plan under the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). See Ram Tech. Servs. v. Koresko, No. 03-6163-AA, 2004 WL
1050888, at *4–5 (D. Or. Apr. 15, 2004) (no “plan” under ERISA if contract setting forth
the benefit plan is voidable for fraudulent-inducement under state law); see also Nash v. Trs.
of Bos. Univ., 946 F.2d 960, 964–67 (1st Cir. 1991) (ERISA incorporates fraudulent-
inducement defense under federal common law); Yeckel v. Abbott, No. 03-04-00713-CV,
2009 WL 1563587 (Tex. App. June 4, 2009) (same).
119. See, e.g., Still v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 368 U.S. 35, 38–39, 40–41 (1961); H.J.
Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637, 642–43 (Okla. 1964).
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Carolina Supreme Court disagreed:
To so hold would be to require an employer who learns of a
misrepresentation subsequent to an injury to elect either
termination, in which case it may be subject to a wrongful
discharge suit, or retention of the employee, in which case it is
liable for worker’s compensation. We decline to put the
employers of this state on the horns of such a dilemma.120
This reasoning is incomplete. Every firing entails some risk of a
meritless wrongful-discharge suit, as reduced by available sanctions for
filing a frivolous lawsuit121 and managed by liability insurance or
arbitration clauses, among other things. Perhaps in these cases there is an
above-average risk of a non-frivolous yet meritless wrongful-discharge
suit, because, once terminated, the injured worker might sue under South
Carolina statutory law prohibiting discharge of an employee “because the
employee has instituted . . . any proceeding” under the state’s workers’
compensation law.122 On the other hand, if the injured worker is not an
“employee” under the state’s workers’ compensation statute, then that
statute’s exclusive-remedy provisions—which restrict the rights and
remedies of that “employee”123—do not bar the injured “employee” from
filing a tort claim or some other cause of action (meritless or not) against
the employer to recover for the worker’s injury. Thus, it is unclear
whether, by its own reasoning, the South Carolina Supreme Court in fact
increased or decreased the risk of meritless wrongful-discharge suits.
For another example, when employment testers sued an employment
agency under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981), which
affords “all persons” the “same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,”124 the D.C.
Circuit concluded that, even if they could prove that the defendant had
treated them differently because of their race, they had no cognizable injury
under section 1981.125 The court reasoned in part that, because they had
misrepresented their intentions and presented fictitious credentials, at best
that defendant had denied the plaintiff-testers the opportunity to enter into
voidable contracts. This did not violate section 1981, because “the rule that
120. Small v. Oneita Indus., 459 S.E.2d 306, 307 (S.C. 1995); see Ga. Elec. Co. v.
Rycroft, 378 S.E.2d 111, 115 (Ga. 1989) (declaring without explaining why “[i]t is not
necessary for the employment to be void, as opposed to merely voidable”).
121. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-10 (2011) (South Carolina Frivolous Civil
Proceedings Sanctions Act).
122. Id. § 41-1-80.
123. Id. § 42-1-540.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
125. Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).
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contracts obtained through misrepresentations are merely voidable rather
than void seems designed entirely to protect the target of the
misrepresentations.”126
This reasoning is flawed. The fraudulent-inducement defense protects
the defrauded party by giving it the option to rescind. Unless and until it
exercises that option, a voidable contract is no less valid and enforceable,
and thus no less a contract under which the misrepresenting party still has
rights. Thus, denying a person the right to make a voidable contract
because he is not white still denies that person rights that he would have
had “under the . . . proposed contractual relationship.”127 Indeed, if
voidable contracts are never “contracts” under section 1981, then section
1981, intended to protect against race discrimination, never protects
minors, the mentally ill, and others that can make only voidable contracts,
as well as their counterparties.
Second, even if a worker’s misrepresentation has rendered the
employment contract void, not just voidable, under contract principles,128
the statutory terms “employee” or “employment” in many work law
statutes do not make a valid contract a necessary condition to proving a
claim. For example, employment discrimination statutes often do not
define an employee by reference to a “contract” or similar language,
though they do not expressly preclude the incorporation of common-law
contract defenses either. Congress defined “employee” under Title VII as
“an individual employed by an employer,”129 but did not define “employed”
or cognates, such as “employment,” even though section 703(a) of Title VII
prohibits, among other things, employer actions taken with respect to an
individual that affect that individual’s “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,” or “status as an employee,” because of that individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.130
For definitions of “employee” like these in federal statutes, the U.S.
Supreme Court has presumed that the statutory term “employee” describes
126. Id.; accord Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1138–40 (9th Cir. 2000).
127. Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (1981); cf. Honaker v. Duro Bag
Mfg. Co., 851 S.W.2d 481, 483–84 (Ky. 1993) (showing that claimant violated condition
precedent to contract when he sent imposter to required pre-employment physical exam, and
therefore was barred from benefits under state workers’ compensation statute).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006). For the same or similar definitions of “employee” in
other employment discrimination statutes, see, as examples: 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2006);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(5)(a) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-2(3) (West 2011);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302(1) (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(10) (2011).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2006). To the extent section 703(a) declares unlawful
employer discrimination against categories of people other than employees, such as job
applicants, that section cannot plausibly require any contract to have ever existed between
the aggrieved individual and the employer.
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“the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-
law agency doctrine,” absent indications of legislative intent to the
contrary.131 In turn, common-law agency doctrine provides that an agency
relationship, including a master-servant relationship, may exist absent any
valid contract,132 but cannot exist without “manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act.”133 Thus, any worker
misrepresentation at the time of hire does not necessarily defeat a claim
under such a reading, even if it renders the contract void under common-
law contract principles, unless the misrepresentation defeats the consent
required for an agency relationship to exist.
D. Unclean Hands
To base an employee-misconduct defense to liability (contract or
otherwise) on the unclean hands doctrine, one must overcome this problem:
any such justification largely derives from contestable conclusions as to the
purpose of that doctrine and the moral judgments that doctrine authorizes.
By the early twentieth-century, the unclean hands doctrine was said to
bar equitable relief upon a showing that the plaintiff committed misconduct
that is, “in regard to, or at all events connected with, the matter in litigation,
so that it has in some measure affected the equitable relations subsisting
between the two parties and arising out of the transaction.”134
Contemporary versions of this doctrine similarly require at least some
misconduct that is connected to the matter in litigation. Courts vary in the
words used to describe the requisite misconduct severity (e.g.,
“unconscionable”) as well as the kind of connection to the matter in
litigation. For example, some state courts require the plaintiff’s
misconduct to be somehow connected to the transaction at issue in the
litigation,135 while other courts have adopted or favorably referred to the
idea that the plaintiff must have engaged in the misconduct “in acquiring
the right he now asserts.”136
131. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (ERISA); accord Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v.
Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–45 (2003) (ADA).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225 cmt. a, 220 cmt. b, 1 cmt. b (1958).
133. Id. § 1.
134. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, 1 A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 741 (4th ed.
1918).
135. E.g., Scruggs v. Wyatt, 60 So.3d 758, 773 (Miss. 2011) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey,
724 So.2d 335, 337 (Miss. 1998)) (“willful misconduct in the transaction at issue”).
136. E.g., Adams v. Manown, 615 A.2d 611, 617 (Md. 1992); City of St. Joseph v. Lake
Contrary Sewer Dist., 251 S.W.3d 362, 369 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Mechem v. City of Santa
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In turn, multiple justifications have been offered for the unclean hands
defense. One is that, though often styled as an affirmative defense,137 the
unclean-hands doctrine primarily aims not to protect a party to the
litigation, but to preserve court integrity by refusing to let the coercive
machinery of the court system be used to profit from immoral conduct.138
Yet, the unclean hands doctrine may at the same time reduce court integrity
(however defined) because, among other reasons, the doctrine also lets
stand a wrong committed by the defendant for which a court would
otherwise provide redress.139
Another justification is the norm of tu quoque. If a speaker (here, the
plaintiff) blames or condemns another for wrongdoing (including, by
bringing a lawsuit), the illocutionary force of that speech act (roughly, how
strongly that speech act accomplishes the speaker’s intention to blame
without regard to the truth value of what is said) is deflated or diminished
where the speaker has committed the same, similar, or related
wrongdoing.140 Still another justification is retribution: by denying redress
to the plaintiff for defendant’s wrongdoing, a court punishes the plaintiff
for committing its own wrongdoing. That punishment is proportional,
because the plaintiff’s wrong must be the same, similar, or related to the
defendant’s wrongdoing.141
An unclean-hands rationale for the employee-misconduct defense,
however, faces at least three hurdles. First, only some state courts have
extended this doctrine, traditionally a bar to equitable relief, to remedies at
law as well.142 Thus, in states where the doctrine has not been so extended,
it is unavailable to preclude an employer’s liability in damages.
Second, an unclean-hands rationale derives from contestable
conclusions about the nature and priority of the purposes behind the
unclean-hands doctrine and the moral norms it is supposed to embody.
Thus, the scope of the unclean-hands defense rises and falls depending on
validity and scope of these moral norms. In worker suits involving
employee misconduct, it is not self-evident that a court-integrity purpose of
Fe, 634 P.2d 690, 692 (N.M. 1981); Kingston Hill Acad. v. Chariho Reg’l Sch. Dist., 21
A.3d 264, 270 (R.I. 2011); Adrian v. McKinnie, 684 N.W.2d 91, 93 (S.D. 2004). For a
similar formulation, see Nakahara v. NS 1991 Am. Trust, 718 A.2d 518, 523 (Del. Ch.
1998); see also Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933).
137. E.g., Kingston Hill Acad., 21 A.3d at 270.
138. E.g., Pappas v. Pappas, 320 A.2d 809, 811 (Conn. 1973); T. Leigh Anenson,
Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 509 (2010).
139. Ori J. Herstein, A Normative Theory of the Clean Hands Defense, 17 LEGAL
THEORY 171, 178–82 (2011).
140. See id. at 191–98.
141. See id. at 200–01.
142. T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99
KY. L.J. 63 (2011).
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the doctrine justifies a misconduct defense to employer liability. Employer
avenues for recovery for misconduct-losses143 can reduce or eliminate the
extent of any “profit” from the misconduct, particularly given the low cost
of asserting counterclaims in the worker’s suit. Moreover, the moral
valence is unclear, for it is extremely unlikely that a worker commits
misconduct with the goal of later becoming injured by, and suing based on,
the employer’s wrongful act.
Third, any unclean-hands rationale is under-determinate as applied,
given under-determinacy about whether the plaintiff’s wrongdoing is the
same, similar to, or connected enough with the defendant’s wrongdoing.
The plaintiff-worker’s wrongdoing will never be exactly the same as
defendant-employer’s wrongdoing, because unlike employers, workers
cannot fire, refuse to hire, or deny workers’ compensation benefits,
wrongly or otherwise.
Moreover, the unclean hands doctrine does not say how to judge
whether a plaintiff-worker’s wrongdoing is similar or connected enough.
How is, for example, a worker’s theft of company trade secrets while on
the job similar or connected enough to the employer’s discriminatory
firing? The answer depends on some criteria external to the doctrine for
selecting certain characteristics of each side’s wrongdoing as salient for
comparison. Only then can one compare those characteristics for
similarity.
For example, stealing company property can be characterized as
categorically different, if what should count when comparing wrongs is
how much each side’s wrong implicates the other’s property rights. Or
each side’s wrongdoing can virtually always be counted as similar or
connected enough, if what should matter is that a necessary condition for
each wrong is the employment relationship between worker and employer.
Whatever the merits of these competing characterizations, the unclean
hands doctrine does not provide the grounds for choosing between them.144
Similarly, where the worker’s claim arises under a statute, the unclean
hands doctrine may not apply where, by operation of the doctrine itself, a
countervailing public policy advanced by the statute warrants relief for the
plaintiff’s claim, his misconduct notwithstanding.145 The problem is that,
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. This conceptual problem is not unique to unclean hands, but has been claimed to
plague generally certain kinds of “equality” arguments, including applications of the judicial
norm to treat like cases alike. See generally PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF “EQUALITY” IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE
(1990).
145. Where the worker’s claim arises under common law, there is no statutory
interpretation issue, leaving only the question of whether, by operation of the unclean-hands
doctrine itself, a countervailing public policy advanced by the common law on which the
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again, any unclean-hands justification for the defense is derivative of the
moral judgments it permits and the external criteria it adopts to compare
the wrongdoing on both sides. Without those, we cannot begin to decide
whether a countervailing public policy is countervailing enough. Yet, on
these issues, courts rarely do more than announce their conclusions.146
Finally, suppose a court substitutes for the traditional unclean-hands
elements by asking instead what the employer would have done, had it
known of the misconduct. If this substitution mattered to the case’s
outcome, it would have to be independently justified apart from the unclean
hands doctrine. If not, then there is no good reason to depart from the
unclean-hands doctrine in its various forms.
VII. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION STATUTES
A false-statement defense to workers’ compensation claims presents a
special case. Workers’ compensation benefits are primarily intended to
cover the claimant’s loss of wage-earning capacity due to that injury (not
actual lost wages) as well as medical or hospital expenses caused by that
injury.147 The size of these types of losses would remain the same even if,
absent the workers’ compensation claim, the employer would still have
discovered the employee’s misconduct when it did and fired the employee
for it, because the size of these losses are not a function of the time that
elapses after the injury occurs. Courts discussing a false-statement defense
to liability for workers’ compensation claims have offered two main
justifications: (1) a public policy against fraud and (2) preserving employer
ability to receive reimbursement from the state’s second-injury fund
(SIF).148
plaintiff relies warrants relief for his or her claim.
146. E.g., Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 35 Cal. App. 4th 620, 639 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (failing to explain why plaintiffs’ misrepresentations about their prior felony
convictions “relate directly” to their wrongful termination claims, or why barring those
claims on unclean-hands grounds “adequately serve[s]” state “public policies,” except by
vaguely pointing to the misrepresentations’ “nature,” their “potential damage to [the
employer],” and that plaintiffs “were disqualified from employment by means of
government requirements.”).
147. See 4 LARSON, supra note 31, § 80.02D (compiling cases).
148. On the fraud justification, see Shippers Transp. of Ga. v. Stepp, 578 S.W.2d 232,
234 (Ark. 1979); Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434, 440 (Del. 1965); Martin Co. v.
Carpenter, 132 So. 2d 400, 406 (Fla. 1961); Ga. Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 378 S.E.2d 111, 114
(Ga. 1989); and Fed. Copper & Aluminum Co. v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tenn.
1973). On the SIF justification, see Air Mod Corp., 215 A.2d at 440; Martin Co., 132 So.2d
at 406; Rycroft, 378 S.E.2d at 114; Nabors Drilling USA v. Davis, 857 So.2d 407, 414–15
(La. 2003); Jewison v. Frerichs Constr., 434 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1989); Oesterreich v.
Canton-Inwood Hosp., 511 N.W.2d 824, 827 (S.D. 1994); Fed. Copper, 493 S.W.2d at 464;
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A. Fraud
It is difficult to justify an anti-fraud rationale for a false-statement
defense in particular. The employer can recover for a job applicant’s fraud
in a separate lawsuit alleging fraud, and such recovery is poorly
approximated by the value of the injured worker’s foregone workers’
compensation benefits. And where a fraudulent-inducement contract
defense is not incorporated by reference into the statute itself,149 that
principle, founded on making contracts consensual, does not obviously
apply when the employer’s wrongful act violates a statutory duty, because
that duty does not require individual employer consent to apply.
A few courts have argued that since employers must bear the “risks”
of an “infirm” employee, job applicant misrepresentations defeat an
employer’s ability to determine a worker’s health before employment in
order to avoid “possible liability for an accidental injury, causally related to
an infirmity,”150 or more generally, the “risks which are resultant from
hiring an infirm employee.”151 Perhaps this means that a false-statement
defense motivates job applicants to tell the truth, and that helps employers
avoid hiring someone because of their prior injury in order to reduce their
expected workers’ compensation costs (“possible liability”). If so, then
false-statement defenses seem aimed to help employers do what the ADA
now prohibits. Title I of the ADA does not permit fear of increased
workers’ compensation costs as the motive for not hiring someone with an
actual or perceived physical impairment.152
and 1996 Alaska Op. Att’y Gen. 251, No. 661-95-0748, 1996 WL 1062199, at *2 (Sept. 17,
1996). One court has offered equitable estoppel doctrine as a justification. Lamay v.
Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 882 P.2d 559, 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). But see Stovall v. Sally
Salmon Seafood, 757 P.2d 410, 418 (Or. 1988) (rejecting this argument).
149. See supra Part VI.C.
150. Shippers Transp., 578 S.W.2d at 234.
151. Martin Co., 132 So. 2d at 400, 406.
152. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (2011) (interpretative guidance on Title I of the
ADA) (discussion of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l), providing that the “regarded as” definition is
satisfied if the employer “made an employment decision because of a perception of
disability based on ‘myth, fear or stereotype,’” citing “workers’ compensation costs” as an
employer concern that is one among many “common attitudinal barriers that frequently
result in employers excluding individuals with disabilities”); Baker v. Windsor Republic
Doors, 414 F. App’x 764, 772 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Requiring an employee with a heart
condition to waive workers’ compensation benefits otherwise available to non-disabled
employees . . . smacks of exactly the type of discrimination that the ADA seeks to
prevent.”).
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B. Second Injury Fund
In a few states, a false-statement defense to workers’ compensation
liability can be justified as preserving employer access to a state’s second-
injury fund (SIF). In some cases, a worker’s work injury is attributable in
whole or part to a prior injury suffered by that worker before coming to
their current employer. For such cases, states adopted SIFs to pay all or
some of the workers’ compensation benefits for which the worker was
otherwise eligible (or reimburse the employer’s workers’ compensation
insurer for such payment). When the SIF pays, the insurer does not charge
the employer the higher premiums it otherwise would because of that
worker’s injury.
The purpose of SIFs was to remove employer fear of increased
workers’ compensation premiums as a reason not to hire and retain
disabled workers, and thereby increase their employment opportunities.153
In some states, however, the SIF pays only if the employer knew of the
worker’s prior injury at the time of hire or at least before the second injury
occurred.154 In those states, if a worker makes false statements as to a prior
medical condition at the time of hire, that worker could thereby preclude
employers from obtaining SIF relief if that worker suffers a qualifying
work injury. If the employer fears loss of SIF payments due to worker
false statements about their prior medical conditions, the worry is that such
fear reduces any SIF effect on employer hiring or retention of disabled
workers.
This justification is limited. Many states have eliminated their SIFs or
closed them to new claims. Of the sixteen states with a general false-
statement defense, only four have SIFs that impose an employer knowledge
requirement and that are currently open to new claims (Table 1). Similarly,
of the sixteen states with a false-statement defense concerning occupational
disease, only two have SIFs that impose an employer knowledge
requirement and that remain open to new claims (Table 2).155
153. E.g., VECO Alaska, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Labor, Div. of Workers' Comp., 189
P.3d 983, 987 (Alaska 2008); Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 732, 733
(Mass. 1995); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SECOND INJURY FUNDS: STANDARDS AND
PATTERNS IN STATE LEGISLATION (1957) (Bulletin 190). It is not clear how much a state SIF
uniquely increases disabled workers’ employment opportunities, given the ADA and similar
state statutes.
154. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.205(c) (2012) (proof by “written records” that
employer had “knowledge of the permanent physical impairment before the subsequent
injury and that the employee was retained in employment after the employer acquired that
knowledge”).
155. On open SIFs, see U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2011 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAWS 105-12 (2011) and S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-7-320(B) (2012); cf. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1371.2 (2012) (closed to claims for accidents occurring after Dec. 31,
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Table 1: False-Statement Defense (General) and SIF
State Open SIF? Employer Knowledge Required?
AL No -






LA Yes LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1378(A)(2) (2012)






TN Yes TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-208(a)(2) (2012)
VA Yes No
Table 2: False-Statement Defense (Occupational Disease) and SIF
State Open SIF? Employer Knowledge Required?
AL No -












NV Yes NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616B.557(4) (LexisNexis 2012)
RI No -
SC No -
2014). For the state columns, see supra notes 27, 29, and 30.
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VIII. AGAINST THE DEFENSE: EFFECTS ON CASE SELECTION AND
SETTLEMENT
This Part evaluates the main argument against the employee-
misconduct defense: the defense reduces case payoffs, which in turn
decreases expected attorney contingency fees, thus causing plaintiff-side
attorneys to select fewer otherwise meritorious cases to litigate and to settle
such cases for less money. In this view’s best exemplar, Hart (2008)
conducted phone interviews in early 2007 with twenty lawyers who worked
in large cities and handled exclusively or primarily employment
litigation.156 From their responses to her (apparently open-ended)
questions, she concluded that an employment-discrimination plaintiff “with
misconduct in her record that might support the defense is unlikely to
proceed very far in litigation,” because plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely
to select such cases and are more likely to settle them and for less.157
This argument is incomplete in two ways. First, however much the
defense does reduce case selection or settlement price, it does not
necessarily follow that the defense ought to be eliminated. For that
argument, one must show that, all things considered, a world without the
defense is better than a world with the defense with respect to some set of
values that provide the relevant metrics for comparison. Put another way,
any case against an employee-misconduct defense must show that the
world is better without it even though, with respect to some value, the
defense has some benefit. To be sure, because the defense implicates
multiple values, the world without the defense may be better with respect to
one value (e.g., human dignity), but not another value (e.g., full consent in
forming contracts). Indeed, absent an agreed-upon ordinal ranking of
values, we may not have a rational reason to conclude that a world with the
defense is better, worse, or equally as good as a world without it.158 At the
very least, defense opponents assume away their argumentative burden by
assuming that the defense has zero benefit.
156. See Hart, supra note 1, at 430-34.
157. Id. at 434.
158. On a possible fourth relation of comparison, parity, see Ruth Chang, The
Possibility of Parity, 112 ETHICS 659 (2002); and Martijn Boot, Parity, Incomparability and
Rationally Justified Choice, 146 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 75 (2009).
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Figure 2: Causal Graph of Effect of Employee-Misconduct Defense on Case Payoffs
The rest of this Part discusses how hard it is to measure how much the
defense reduces the selection or settlement price of otherwise meritorious
claims, and thus how much to weigh such arguments against the defense.
Such arguments imply a model (illustrated in Figure 2) of the paths by
which the defense (D), by permitting employee-misconduct evidence into
the case, affects plaintiff’s actual or estimated net case payoffs (Y), and
thus attorney case selection odds (Sl) and settlement price (St).
First, it affects case payoffs to an extent depending on how the defense
by law affects probability of establishing defendant liability (Pr) or affects
the remedies available to the plaintiff as a result (R), conditional on the
probability of prevailing on the defense. Where the defense precludes
liability (ܦ → ܲݎ), the plaintiff’s expected case payoff is zero at best.
Where the defense limits otherwise available remedies (ܦ → ܴ), the net
case payoff drops accordingly.
Second, the defense, by introducing misconduct evidence, reduces
jury or judge sympathy toward the plaintiff (ܦ → ܵܬ ), thereby reducing
expected case payoffs, even if the employer cannot prevail on the defense
as a matter of law. The premise here is that judges or juries decide liability
or the size of damages awards based partly on their level of sympathy for
the plaintiff, even though they are not supposed to act this way.
There are several problems here. One is that even under this model,
the size of the defense’s effect on case payoffs may be both non-negligible
and quite small relative to other possible influences on case payoffs, such
as attorney-fee shifting statutes or the ease of using aggregation devices
such as the class action. Yet, even putting that aside, there are three
alternative paths by which employee-misconduct evidence can affect net
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case payoffs: (1) if admitted as impeachment evidence; (2) if admitted to
support an employer counterclaim to recover misconduct-losses; and, (3) if
introduced in a separate employer lawsuit to recover misconduct losses.
First, some employee-misconduct evidence can be admitted as
impeachment evidence (I).159 Impeachment evidence can reduce expected
case payoffs by reducing judge or jury sympathy toward the plaintiff, and
thus reducing the probability of proving defendant liability (ܫ→ ܵܬ →
ܲݎ→ ܻ) or the expected value of otherwise available remedies (ܫ→ ܵܬ →
ܴ → ܻ). This can occur independently of how much impeachment evidence
reduces case payoffs by reducing the credibility of plaintiff testimony, and
thus the probability of proving defendant liability (ܫ→ ܲݎ→ ܻ). Although
limiting instructions can accompany impeachment evidence to remind
jurors to consider such evidence only to judge credibility, not infer bad
character, they may not work, as some mock jury studies suggest.160
Similarly, with respect to motion practice or bench trials, some studies
suggest that judges experience a similar level of difficulty in setting aside
personal sympathy or antipathy for a party based on biasing evidence, even
if that evidence is ruled inadmissible.161
Second, some employee-misconduct evidence can be admitted to
prove an employer’s counterclaim based on the employee’s misconduct (C)
in cases where such a counterclaim can be pleaded and litigated. To be
sure, an employer counterclaim is unavailable in some cases, such as where
the worker files suit in federal court and that court lacks an independent
ground of jurisdiction to hear the employer’s potential state-law
counterclaim.162 In cases where an employer counterclaim can and is
brought, such evidence may reduce case payoffs by reducing judge or jury
sympathy toward the plaintiff, and thus the probability of proving liability(ܥ → ܵܬ → ܲݎ→ ܻ) or the expected value of available remedies (ܥ →
159. Hart, supra note 1, at 429, 448.
160. Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting
Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 477
(1988); Jennifer S. Hunt & Thomas Lee Budesheim, How Jurors Use and Misuse Character
Evidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347 (2004).
161. E.g., Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005); Stephen Landsman
& Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Effect of Potentially Biasing
Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (1994).
162. Where a counterclaim is compulsory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a),
it necessarily falls within the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 53, § 1414. An employer counterclaim based on a non-
NLRA violation is also unavailable in an NLRB proceeding, but case selection and
settlement dynamics are substantially different for NLRB proceedings, because the NLRB
General Counsel has the exclusive authority to pursue unfair labor practice charges before
the NLRB.
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ܵܬ → ܴ → ܻ).
Moreover, and to an extent based on how likely the employer will
prevail on a potential counterclaim, that counterclaim affects the plaintiff’s
net case payoff (ܥ→ ܻ), and that in turn may affect attorney case selection
and settlement price depending on some function of the ways attorneys can
write their fee agreements, the potential plaintiff’s ability to pay, and the
risk of violating attorney ethics rules that bar attorneys from charging
“unreasonable” fees.163 For example, plaintiffs’ attorneys could write their
contingency-fee agreements to compute fees as a fraction of what the
plaintiff is actually paid, i.e., net recovery after offsetting any counterclaim
award.164 Or where the plaintiff has more of an ability to pay fees out of
pocket, those attorneys might compute fees for the plaintiff’s claim as a
fraction of plaintiff’s gross recovery but separately bill the plaintiff by the
hour for defending against any counterclaim, with that hourly fee payable
regardless of, or contingent upon, the defeat of the counterclaim.165
Third, some employee-misconduct evidence can be admitted to prove
the employer’s separate lawsuit based on the employee’s misconduct (L).
Here, because the misconduct evidence is introduced in an employer-
initiated separate proceeding, it likely would not reduce judge or jury
sympathy toward the plaintiff in the plaintiff’s suit. Still, such evidence
can still reduce expected net payoffs in the employee’s suit, if the employer
prevails in its suit and, under the plaintiff-attorney’s fee agreement, the
contingency fee is calculated as a percentage of worker’s recovery less
what the worker had to pay to satisfy the judgment against it in the
employer’s separate suit. If, however, for fee calculation purposes, the
contingency-fee contract does not treat worker’s net recovery as accounting
for the judgment in the employer’s separate suit, then this path (ܮ→ ܻ)
should not affect net case outcomes.
Given these multiple paths by which employee-misconduct evidence
can affect net case payoffs, as well as the set of potential other influences,
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1983) (same for “clearly excessive fee”).
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35, cmt. d (2000) (“In
the absence of prior agreement to the contrary, the amount of the client’s recovery is
computed net of any offset, such as a recovery by an opposing party on a counterclaim.”).
For cases endorsing this presumption, see Camden Nat’l Bank v. Steamship Navigation Co.,
991 A.2d 800, 803–04 (Me. 2010); Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 92
(Tex. 2001); see also In re William J. Murphy, P.C. v. State, 157 A.D.2d 155, 158 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990).
165. E.g., S.C. Ethics Advisory Op. 84-11, 1984 WL 272922 (DR 2-106(A) does not
categorically prohibit fee contract with contingency fee for pursuing plaintiff’s claim and
hourly fee for defending counterclaim); cf. SC Adv. Op. 87-07, 1988 WL 582702
(explaining that under certain circumstances, state law permits contingency fee calculated
by the hourly rate but capped at client’s total recovery).
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it matters by how much the defense uniquely affects case payoffs, i.e., by
how much net case payoffs would be different absent the defense. This is
not easy to measure. There is little cross-jurisdictional variation to exploit
within the United States, because courts are virtually uniform in allowing
impeachment evidence and (aside from the NLRB and workers’
compensation hearing officers) the pleading of counterclaims, and because
the employee-misconduct defense is already quite pervasive. In actually
litigated cases, the trial record alone will be limited, because where the
employee-misconduct evidence has been introduced along one path, neither
the trial judge nor the parties are likely to have also litigated, for the record,
whether and how such evidence would have been admitted or introduced
on one or more alternative paths. Perhaps more promising is to ask
attorneys to estimate case payoffs in hypothetical cases, and measure how
much those estimates are influenced by case characteristics (manipulable
by the researcher), such as fee-shifting statutes or potential damage size, as
well as their beliefs about and past experience with actual cases involving
employee-misconduct evidence.
Even then, estimating case payoffs is further complicated, because in
cases where the employer has a non-frivolous argument for introducing
employee-misconduct evidence by defense, counterclaim, or separate suit,
the plaintiff has at least two counter-moves: (1) ask the trial judge to
bifurcate the proceeding into liability and remedy phases; and, (2) bring a
new claim, either during or after the plaintiff’s original lawsuit, based on
showing the employer’s retaliatory motive for asserting the defense,
counterclaim, or separate lawsuit.
A. Bifurcation
To reduce the effect of jury sympathy, a trial judge could bifurcate the
proceeding, that is, order separate trials for liability issues and issues
concerning the employer’s misconduct-based defense or counterclaim.166
For federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides: “For
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court
may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”167 Some states afford
similar discretion to state judges, while other states allow for much less.168
166. E.g., Sprang, supra note 1, at 151 (arguing for bifurcation such that, in the liability
phase, “after-acquired evidence should be completely inadmissible for any purpose”).
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). For criticism of any presumption against bifurcation, see
Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705 (2000).
168. Compare, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1048(b) (West 2012); IOWA R. CIV. P.
1.914; N.Y.C.P.L.R. 603 (McKinney 2012) with, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1562
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Mock jury studies have found some effect of bifurcation in personal injury
cases on the size of damage awards.169
In cases where the employee-misconduct evidence only matters to
remedies, there is a viable argument that the trial judge should order a
separate trial on liability before having the jury decide the defense, if the
misconduct evidence is not otherwise probative on issues of liability.
Bifurcation here would avoid any prejudice. And bifurcation would
advance judicial economy, because if the jury finds for the defendant on
liability, there is no need to consider the employee-misconduct defense.
For example, courts have endorsed bifurcation to handle evidence of a
plaintiff’s undocumented immigration status in cases where such status
may affect entitlement to back pay, but not defendant liability.170
In contrast, bifurcation arguably advances neither judicial economy
nor avoids prejudice in cases where the misconduct evidence is already
admissible as impeachment evidence.171 Bifurcation also may be harder to
secure in cases where employee-misconduct evidence is probative of the
defendant’s counterclaim. In cases like these, granting a bifurcation
motion stands in tension with the judicial-economy benefits of rules
permitting counterclaims in lieu of making the defendant file a separate
lawsuit.172
B. New Claims Based on Retaliatory Motive
Under certain circumstances, the plaintiff-employee can pursue a new
legal claim against the employer if the employer had a retaliatory motive
for asserting the defense, counterclaim, or separate lawsuit against that
plaintiff-employee. This section considers two examples: a retaliation
claim under section 704 of Title VII and process torts under state common
law. In turn, these claims face several hurdles, including those imposed by
constitutional protections of the right to petition.
First, section 704(a) of Title VII declares it unlawful for an employer
to “discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
(2011) (authorizing bifurcation of liability and damages if “all parties” consent).
169. E.g., Christine Shea Adams & Martin Bourgeois, Separating Compensatory and
Punitive Damage Award Decisions by Trial Bifurcation, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 11 (2006).
170. Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title
VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 473, 529–30 (2005).
171. E.g., Adelman v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 1998 WL 51131, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5,
1998); see Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 468 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument
that, in Title VII case, trial court should not have let after-acquired-evidence of employee
misconduct to impeach plaintiff credibility, because evidence might prejudice the jury).
172. E.g., Vichare, 106 F.3d at 466–67.
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employment . . . because he has opposed any practice” that Title VII made
“an unlawful employment practice . . . , or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].”173 This provision protects former
employees as well,174 and the phrase “discriminate against” in section
704(a) covers only those employer acts that are “materially adverse to a
reasonable employee or job applicant,” regardless of whether such acts
concern terms or conditions of employment.175
A few judges—mostly from one federal district court—have read
section 704(a) of Title VII, or similar provisions in other statutes, not to
cover an employer’s filing of counterclaims against the employee. They
reason that a counterclaim cannot necessarily discourage plaintiffs from
enforcing their legal rights, because a counterclaim is filed only after the
plaintiff has secured attorneys and filed suit against the employer.176 Based
on the same reasoning, one judge refused to read section 704(a) to cover
the employer’s assertion of an employee-misconduct defense to an
employment-discrimination claim, and further emphasized that, unlike a
counterclaim, raising a defense raises no fear that the plaintiff will end up
having to pay a money judgment.177 Other judges, however, have read
retaliation provisions to cover employer counterclaims, presumably
because counterclaims can discourage the reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position from pursuing his lawsuit further, and thus lower his
173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
174. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1997).
175. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). For
similar readings of parallel state statutes, see Donovan v. Broward Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
974 So. 2d 458, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Hoffelt v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Rights, 867
N.E.2d 14, 19–21 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Roa v. Roa, 985 A.2d 1225, 1236–37 (N.J. 2010);
Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 879 N.E.2d 174, 180 n.2 (Ohio 2007); and Allen v. McPhee, 240
S.W.3d 803, 820 (Tenn. 2007).
176. E.E.O.C. v. K & J Mgmt., Inc., No. 99 C 8116, 2000 WL 34248366, at *4-5 (N.D.
Ill. June 8, 2000) (Title VII); accord Gross v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.,
599 F.Supp.2d 23, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (ADEA); Beltran v. Brentwood N. Healthcare Ctr., 426
F.Supp.2d 827, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (FLSA); Neuffer v. York Corrugated Container Corp.,
No. 03 C 1658, 2004 WL 1354442, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2004) (ADA). Some of these
courts also indicate that where the employer’s counterclaim is compulsory under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), that counterclaim cannot fall within section 704(a) of Title
VII or another similar statute if the employer filed it solely to avoid forfeiting that claim
under Rule 13(a). See Gross, 599 F.Supp.2d at 34; Beltran, 426 F. Supp.2d at 834. While
an employer might have both retaliatory and non-retaliatory motives for filing its
compulsory counterclaim, it remains unsettled whether section 704(a) of Title VII
authorizes mixed-motive liability. Compare Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir.
2010) (yes) with Hayes v. Sebelius, 762 F.Supp.2d 90, 113–14 (D.D.C. 2011) (no).
177. Harmar v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 95 C 7665, 1996 WL 199734, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 23, 1996).
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settlement price.178 To date, no court has ruled that an employer’s assertion
of the employee-misconduct defense can count as retaliation under section
704(a) or similar provisions.
Second, the tort of abuse of process under state common law arises
based on injury caused by willful and improper use of judicial process
primarily with an ulterior motive.179 In a few states, the tort has been
successfully claimed based on, among other things, extensive discovery
procedures to expose a party to excessive legal expenses and fees,180 or
extensive motion practice generally.181 In contrast, while some states
permit the tort of malicious prosecution based on the filing of a
counterclaim, only one state has expressly recognized a tort of malicious
defense, whereas other state supreme courts have refused to recognize that
tort, citing the fear of discouraging defendants and their attorneys from
vigorously raising legitimate defenses.182
C. Constitutional Right to Petition
These and other new retaliatory-motive claims are restricted by the
First Amendment’s protection of “the right of the people . . . to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.”183 This Petition Clause has been
declared or at least presumed to protect a person’s right of access to courts
for redress of wrongs, often by operation of the canon of reading statutes to
avoid serious constitutional doubt.184 For example, in Bill Johnson’s
178. E.g., Hill v. Lazarou Enter., Inc., No. 10-61479-CIV, 2011 WL 860526, at *8 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 18, 2011) (Title VII), adopted, 2011 WL 860475 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 09, 2011); Harper
v. Realmark Corp., No. 4:04-CV00040-DFH-WGH, 2004 WL 1795392, at *5 (S.D. Ind.
July 29, 2004) (Title VII); Rosania v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc., 303 F.Supp.2d 878, 882–88
(N.D. Ohio 2004) (retaliation provision of Family and Medical Leave Act); Torres v.
Gristede’s Operating Corp., 628 F.Supp.2d 447, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (FLSA). For
arguments in support, see Hart, supra note 1, at 444–50; Sprang, supra note 1, at 155–56.
179. Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Look What They’ve Done To My Tort, Ma: The Unfortunate
Demise Of “Abuse Of Process” in Maryland, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 36–49 (2002)
(appendices compiling cases by state).
180. Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 880–81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); accord Givens v.
Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 403 (Tenn. 2002).
181. Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882, 887, 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)
(concluding that defendant employed “process” by in part asserting a contributory
negligence defense). But see One Thousand Fleet Ltd. v. Guerriero, 694 A.2d 952, 960
(Md. 1997) (requiring seizure of person or property to result from abuse of process).
182. Compare, e.g., Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1028–29 (N.H. 1995)
(recognizing tort of malicious defense) with, e.g., Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666
(Haw. 2008) (refusing to recognize tort of malicious defense); Wilkinson v. Shoney’s, Inc.,
4 P.3d 1149, 1157–59 (Kan. 2000) (same).
183. U.S. CONST. amend I.
184. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011) (citing cases).
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Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in part
because of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, that the NLRB lacked
the statutory authority to enjoin an ongoing lawsuit as an unfair labor
practice, even if brought and pursued with a retaliatory motive, unless that
suit lacked a reasonable basis.185
More recently, in BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB (2002), after an
employer had completed its federal lawsuit against various unions, in
which it had lost or withdrawn all its claims, the NLRB filed a complaint
against the employer for violating NLRA section 8(a)(1) by filing and
maintaining that lawsuit to retaliate against the unions for NLRA-protected
activity. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, read NLRA section 8(a)(1)
not to cover “all reasonably based but unsuccessful suits filed with a
retaliatory purpose.”186 This reading avoided the “difficult constitutional
question” of whether the Petition Clause permits the government to declare
unlawful all reasonably-based unsuccessful lawsuits filed with a
“retaliatory motive,” including those motivated by a subjectively genuine
and objectively reasonable belief that the conduct for which the employer
sued is not legally protected.187
In addition, some state courts have declared or implied that petition
clauses in state constitutions protect a right to court access.188 An
alternative (though as yet only theoretical) basis for such a right of access
to courts may be so-called open-courts clauses that appear in thirty-seven
state constitutions and, in various forms, declare that all courts shall be
“open”, that every person shall have “remedy” or “redress” for an “injury”
under the law, or both.189
Some courts have read the First Amendment’s Petition Clause to protect pre-litigation
conduct that is sufficiently related to actual or potential litigation, providing that actual or
potential claim is not a sham. See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 942 (9th Cir.
2006) (reading RICO in light of Petition Clause to not permit “maintenance of a lawsuit for
the sending of a prelitigation demand to settle legal claims that do not amount to a sham”);
Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (pre-litigation
investigation to support a potential claim).
185. Bill Johnson’s Rest., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 744–46 (1983).
186. BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 536 (2002).
187. Id. at 537.
188. E.g., Baba v. Bd. of Supervisors, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 3); Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365
n.5 (Colo. 1984) (COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 24); see Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc.,
763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (N.M. 1988) (“[T]he right of access to the courts is one aspect of the
right to petition for redress of grievances, and we have acknowledged that right as . . . also
protected by [the Due Process Clauses of] both the United States and New Mexico
Constitutions . . . .”). But see Hous. Auth. of King County v. Saylors, 557 P.2d 321, 327
(Wash. 1976) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4, not apply to judicial process).
189. See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES ch. 6 (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2010).
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Because of the Petition Clause or its state constitutional equivalents, if
the plaintiff-worker pursues a new retaliatory-motive claim against the
defendant-employer for filing a defense, separate suit, or counterclaim
based on that worker’s misconduct, a court is likely to read the Petition
Clause to require, for that new claim, that the plaintiff also show that the
employer’s suit, counterclaim or defense lacks an objectively reasonable
basis.190 This restriction arguably applies no differently for the employer’s
defense than its counterclaim or lawsuit, albeit if a court agrees that an
affirmative defense is a “petition” that the court deny the relief requested in
the plaintiff’s lawsuit, and is thus protected by the Petition Clause.191 A
court may be less likely to conclude, however, that a defense counts as a
“remedy” or “redress” for injury under an open-courts clause in a state
constitution.
Either way, where the employer’s suit, counterclaim or defense has
been asserted but not yet resolved, there are two procedural vehicles for
this argument. First, the defendant-employer can argue via a general pre-
trial motion that, because of the Petition Clause, the plaintiff’s retaliatory-
motive claim must be dismissed, because the defendant’s suit, counterclaim
or defense has an objectively reasonable basis. In Bill Johnson’s, the U.S.
Supreme Court explained that in deciding whether a state court suit was
objectively reasonable, if the state court plaintiff could present “evidence
that shows his lawsuit raises genuine issues of material fact,” the NLRB
cannot enjoin that suit.192 This implies that, in practice, where the
defendant’s suit, counterclaim, or defense can survive a plaintiff’s motion
for partial summary judgment, the Petition Clause requires the court to
190. E.g., Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1123 (10th Cir. 2007)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA retaliation
claims for filing counterclaims against her for unauthorized diversion and withdrawal of
bank funds, “[m]ost importantly” because plaintiff “has not shown, nor does she even seem
to argue, that [defendant’s] counterclaims are devoid of merit”) (citing Bill Johnson’s);
Darveau v. Detecon, Inc. 515 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 2008) (assuming that plaintiff bringing
retaliation claim under FLSA “must allege facts demonstrating that he had an objectively
reasonable belief that his employer violated the FLSA,” and finding that plaintiff “met this
burden”); Beltran, 426 F.Supp.2d at 834 n.5 (“[employer]’s counterclaim does not give rise
to a [FLSA] retaliation claim because it was not baseless”); Protect Our Mountain
Environment, 677 P.2d at 1369 (abuse of process tort claim).
191. See Freeman v. Lasky, Haas & Cohler, 410 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“[A]sking a court to deny one’s opponent’s petition is also a form of petition; thus, we may
speak of a ‘sham defense’ as well as a ‘sham lawsuit.’”); see also Harmar v. United
Airlines, Inc., No. 95 C 7665, 1996 WL 199734, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1996) (assuming
arguendo that the after-acquired evidence defense was not frivolous, “that would be another
ground for dismissal since only baseless claims can support a retaliation claim. Even if
motivated by retaliation, filing a lawsuit will not support a retaliation claim if the claims in
the lawsuit are substantial”) (citing Bill Johnson’s).
192. Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 746.
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dismiss the plaintiff’s retaliatory-motive claim as a matter of law, even if it
is undisputed that the defendant had the requisite retaliatory motive.193
Second, the defendant can move to dismiss the plaintiff’s retaliatory-
motive claim pursuant to a state anti-SLAPP statute in the states that have
one. Such a statute typically provides an expedited procedure for
dismissing a claim, and recovering attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by a
party as a result of defending against that claim, where such claim is
premised on a party’s exercise of constitutionally-protected speech or
petition rights and is aimed at intimidating or harassing that party. In some
states, such protected activity includes the petitioning activity of filing a
legal claim,194 consistent with precedent reading the Petition Clause to
protect a right of access to courts.
Assuming arguendo that all state anti-SLAPP statutes currently in
force cover such activity, whereas most of them expressly cover
counterclaims or have been so read,195 no state anti-SLAPP statute to date
appears to have been applied to assertions of affirmative defenses. And it
is unclear whether those statutes will likely be read that way. For example,
while some state anti-SLAPP statutes extend coverage to any “other
193. Without mentioning the constitutional restriction, Hart concludes that it is
“appropriate” for the plaintiff bringing a Title VII retaliation claim to prove both retaliatory
motive and the absence of “some legitimate litigation goal” for, or “legitimate legal
arguments” supporting, the McKennon employee-misconduct defense. Hart, supra note 1,
at 450.
194. E.g., Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler, 938 N.E.2d 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Charles v.
Roads Corp., No. 981380E, 1998 WL 1247935, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 1998).
195. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-751(3) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-505
(2012) (“any claim”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(2)(h) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 8136(a)(1) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(4) (West 2012); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 110/10 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-3(6) (West 2012); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2012);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.01(3) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.528(7) (West 2012)
(“all causes of action”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,242(1) (West 2012); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 76-a(1)(a) (McKinney 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(6)
(Vernon 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1402(1) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.525(1)(a) (West 2012); Hagemann v. City of Marietta, 650 S.E.2d 363, 368 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2007) (reading GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b)); John v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 219
P.3d 1276, 1284 (Nev. 2009) (reading NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660); Jimenez v. Vanderbilt
Landscaping, L.L.C., 3-11-0276, 2011 WL 3027190 (M.D. Tenn. July 25, 2011) (assuming
such a reading of TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003(a)); see also D.C. CODE § 16-5501(2)
(2012). In the remaining state anti-SLAPP statutes, the texts do not expressly cover
counterclaims, though they could arguably be read to do so. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-807(b) (LexisNexis 2012) (defining when a “lawsuit is a SLAAP suit”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (LexisNexis 2012) (“any action seeking money damages”);
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.150(1) (2011) (authorizing “[a] defendant” to make a “special motion
to strike”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041(1) (2012) (same).
PANDYA FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012 11:54 AM
2012] UNPACKING THE EMPLOYEE-MISCONDUCT DEFENSE 925
judicial pleading or filing requesting relief,”196 an assertion of an
affirmative defense could plausibly fall within this phrase, and thus be
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, if the word “relief” is not read to refer
only to legal remedies for a cognizable injury. If this reading is unlikely,
then this reduces the defendant-employer’s payoffs for asserting a defense
as opposed to a counterclaim or separate lawsuit, though by how much
remains unclear.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how virtually all the existing arguments by
courts, agencies, and legal commentators for and against the employee-
misconduct defense in American work law are incomplete, incoherent, or
rely on unverified empirical premises. It has also identified, for certain
circumstances, some more coherent reasons for alternative variants of such
a defense. These include fealty to the restorative (make-whole) purposes of
certain work-law remedies, and for workers’ compensation claims, the
equal opportunity goals of second injury funds in a few of the states that
still have them. In so concluding, this Article concludes that, in general,
courts, agencies, and other legal institutions currently lack a sound reason
for adopting the prevailing version of the employee-misconduct defense,
albeit not because of the prevailing argument against the defense, but
because of the substantially incoherent or incomplete nature of existing
arguments for the defense.
This might imply that, for courts and agencies that have already
adopted it, there is currently no sound reason for continuing to apply it, but
for the norm of stare decisis. To be sure, that norm nominally burdens
those who oppose the defense to persuade that, all things considered, we
are better off in a world without the defense than in a world with it. And to
the extent that arguments for and against the defense implicate multiple
values, this Article is limited in part because it has assumed internal
coherence as itself a relevant value. In contrast, judges and policymakers
may rank that value lower than others in any particular set of
circumstances. Nonetheless, if legal rules require coherent justifications to
be legitimate, then this Article challenges the legitimacy of every actual or
potential work law claim that the prevailing employee-misconduct defense
has or will adversely affect.
196. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/10 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-3(7)
(West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1402(1) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.525(1)(a) (West 2012).
